Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-168 *30 August 1994*

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Spokesman Says Greece Deports More Refugees

AU3008104994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 28 Aug 94

[Text] Public Order Ministry Spokesman Ludmilla Pajo reports that within only six hours this afternoon, 630 refugees were added to the general number of those deported by Greek police via the border crossing points at Kakavije and Kapshtice. The number of deported refugees reached its greatest flux in Kakavije where, within eight hours, 1,000 persons were deported, thus giving a total for today of 1,763 for the three points together.

The lowest number, 23 people within eight hours, was reported in Sarande, five of whom were supplied with regular documents.

As confirmed by our refugees, the Greek police are intensively deporting, maltreating, and putting all kinds of pressure on Albanians everywhere, telling them that they will deport them all, without even considering their regular documents.

Greek Intelligence Contacts With Union Queried

AU3008112194 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 23 Aug 94 p 1

[Anste-signed report: "'Omonia' Trial: Asfalia Promised Assistance to Albanian Trade Unions"]

[Text] Tirana—The trade unions were mentioned again last Sunday, the seventh day of the week, which was also the seventh day of the "Omonia" trial. After this, what until then had been only a shadow of suspicion took on the form of a rather intriguing fact: the interest and involvement of the Greek Asfalia [secret intelligence service] in helping the Albanian trade union movement.

It was the witness Eva Bllaci who testified to the court that during his visit to Greece in 1992 union leader Kalaja had met Andrea Zarbakullas, head of the Greek secret intelligence service for Yannina. It seems that this meeting was not incidental or without any particular goal. While leaving the room at the end of the meeting, Kalaja—again according to Bllaci—said that he had managed "to conclude a contract of assistance for the trade unions."

Thus the statement made two days ago by defendant Kosta Girjeko is now confirmed. In Yannina, I met Gezim Kalaja, whom I did not know—Qirjako told the judges—but he had a recommendation from my friend Egerem Kavaja. Gezim wanted to meet some Yannina dignitaries—Qirjako's statement went on—I phoned the chairman of the Council of Yannina, who was not in town at the time. Then I took Gezim Kalaja to Andrea Zarbakullas, who undertook to arrange the meeting. Now it is the witness Bllaci who confirms not only the "Trade Unions-Asfalia" meeting but also something more regarding the outcome: "a contract of assistance" for the trade union. However, a lot remains to be learned. The nature of this contract and of the promised aid are still in the dark. It is also not known, despite the agreement, whether the contract came to fruition and, if so, to what extent it was put into practice; and further, if this mysterious document still exists—so far the witnesses have spoken in favor of this version—then what are the obligations of the Albanian side contained in this document?

Zhulali, Military Delegation Leave for Egypt

AU2808133294 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 27 Aug 94

[Text] At the invitation of the Egyptian defense minister, Defense Minister of the Republic of Albania Safet Zhulali left for Egypt today on an official visit, leading a high-level military delegation.

Besides meetings with his Egyptian counterpart, Minister Zhulali will be received by Egyptian high-ranking state personalities. The visit will contribute to strengthening and implementing bilateral cooperation, particularly in the field of defense.

ΩDisagreement Over Family Planning, Abortion

94P21114A

[Editorial Report] In preparation for the Cairo World Conference on Population and Development, the Albanian Academy of Sciences, in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and Environmental Protection, organized a symposium on family planning on 4 July 1994. Such a topic is new for Albania. Before the change in regime, abortion was illegal, contraceptives were reported to be unavailable, and the country's birthrate was estimated to be the highest in Europe. According to the 5 July issue of Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE, the Democratic Party newspaper, the symposium included discussion of the social and economic aspects of family planning and the effects of family planning on the health of mothers and children.

In an article published in Tirana REPUBLIKA, the organ of the Albanian Republican Party, on 19 June, Fjodor Kallajxhiu, director of the family planning project in the Ministry of Health, wrote that family planning took "organized form" in Albania in May 1992 following approval by the democratic government of family planning education and services. The Ministry of Health, the United Nations Population Fund, and the World Health Organization cooperate in that activity. Family planning programs have been established in the cities and will be extended to villages after sufficient personnel have been trained, predicted Kallajxhiu. He attributes a reduction in maternal deaths to the availability of legal abortions performed under safe medical conditions. He also took issue with critics, in particular the writer Aurel Plasari, author of a full-page article in REPUBLIKA of 26 May which equated family planning with abortion and called population control a "crime

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against the nation." Kallajxhiu replied: "Family planning is not abortion. It prevents unwanted pregnancy and makes it possible to avoid abortion." He contrasted Albania's pro-natality policy during the communist regime which "claimed so many victims, both mothers and children, and the "active policy for the improvement of health that has begun to be carried out in Albania."

Dr. Gjergji Theodhosi of the Faculty of Medicine at Tirana University, writing in RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE on 14 July, said that there are two hospital centers with modern equipment in Tirana, and doctors and midwives have been instructed in family planning methods in the city's 10 women's counselling centers. Family planning has been initiated in all obstetrical and gynecological centers in the other major cities. Theodhosi said that during the past two or three years one out of four pregnancies had ended in abortion and that the abortion rate in Tirana was even higher. "It does not seem normal that, when all conditions and means exist to prevent unwanted pregnancies, we should have this relatively high number of abortions, even though they are performed in hospital conditions and in accordance with regulations." The author noted that abortions are still being performed outside hospitals, probably for profit, but he took issue with the "tendentious reporting" of another newspaper on the treatment of women who have abortions in clinics and hospitals.

The paper to which Theodhosi referred is probably the Socialist Party paper, ZERI I POPULLIT. In the 3 June issue, an article entitled: "'Mafia in White Coats' in the Abortion and Family Planning Clinic" by Edvin Delo reported that journalists visited the abortion and family planning clinic at the Tirana maternity hospital to investigate charges of corruption in the sale of contraceptives. The employees denied the charges, but patients confirmed them. Delo wrote: "The worst thing is that this clinic, a half-private and half-government facility, occupies premises that belong entirely to the government, employs government personnel, and reaps private profits. If that is not corruption, what is it?" In the 15 June issue of ZERI I POPULLIT, Dr. Eva Sahatci, an employee of the Family Planning Clinic, responded to Delo's criticism of alleged profiteering from the high cost of contraceptives at the clinic. She alluded to an "anonymous clan" that did not want the clinic to open and that "in the name of 'humanism' is calling for the prohibition of abortion and family planning in order to further the illegal abortion industry."

In RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE of 7 June, Teodor Todhe, director of the out- patient department for women and children and for family planning in the Ministry of Health and Environmental Protection, said that there has been a reduction in the number of pregnant women coming to out-patient clinics for pre-natal care. One of the main reasons is unemployment. "Women are not interested in keeping in touch with their doctors and are endangering their lives and the lives of their unborn children." Infant mortality is still high—30 out of 1,000 newborn babies, according to Todhe.

Concern about the increase in infant mortality is echoed in an article in RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE of 3 August, which reports that during the last six months of 1993, 3,209 babies were born and 49 newborn infants died, while in the first six months of 1994, 1,726 babies were born and 108 newborn infants died.

In an interview in RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE of 4 August, Mira Neziri, director of the Tirana maternity hospital, acknowledged that there had been "interference" regarding abortions from religious groups, but nevertheless insisted that medical institutions "should urge the people not to resort to abortion. We advise our patients not to have abortions." According to the interviewer, Neziri and some of her colleagues complained about "some citizens who entered the delivery rooms without permission and behaved brutally toward the doctors. Even though private police officers were on the scene, no concrete measures were taken."

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BSP Leader Calls for Aleksandrov's Resignation

AU2908112894 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 24 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Genadi Popov: Defense Minister Must Go"]

[Text] The scandalous and absolute unacceptable order of Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov to discharge 285 colonels is sufficient reason to renew our demand for his resignation, Zhan Videnov said on 23 August. Aleksandrov is a failed politician and a harmful statesman, who must relieve the Defense Ministry of his presence, the leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] stated categorically. We almost completed our struggle against the spring attempt of Minister Aleksandrov to begin an indiscriminate purge of the officer corps under the formal cover of the law, and we can by no means accept his new move as a prudent compromise, Videnov thinks.

On 22 August, it became clear that 812 officers will be discharge in connection with the autumn reshuffle in the army. Last week, the Bulgarian Army General Staff submitted to the minister a list of 401 officers who are indispensable and who must be kept in the army, despite having reached retirement age. It was precisely this list that apparently prompted Valentin Aleksandrov's undisguised happiness when he announced on Bulgarian national radio on 18 August that he had just learned that there are another 300 excessive colonels who are hiding in various places. Afterward, the information that in addition to the 812, some 285 additional colonels will be discharged was published.

The ministerial order of 22 August points out that those recruited in 1944 and those listed in a special presidential decree are to remain in military service. Army General Lyuben Petrov, Bulgarian Army General Staff chief, told DUMA on 23 August. Highranking officers of the Bulgarian Army were shocked when they learned that their minister considers people such as the commander of the 3d Army, a colonel who carries out the job of a general and who will also have to retire on the basis of Aleksandrov's order, to be "excessive."

Actually, the differences in the figures are a results of the ambitious, but absolutely incompetent, circle around the minister, mili'ary sources told DUMA on 23 August. According to them, the colonels comprise 5.7 percent of the Bulgarian Army Officer Corps, however, Emil Velinov, the personnel chief so much loved by the minister, who himself served only in the Construction Troops, used to report insistently to the minister that the colonels comprise more than 35 percent of the officers.

The issue is not how many officers will be discharged, the important thing is that the Bulgarian Army will not gain anything, Nikolay Dobrev, member of the National Security Commission, said. According to him, this is an absolutely senseless move that will not resolve the army's painful problems of a operational-technical and financial nature or contribute anything to the pressing personnel problem in the army. Those who will be discharged are predominantly experienced military experts, graduates of the Military Academy and higher military schools, people who cannot be replaced within one or two years, the deputy said. He pointed out categorically that, in the final analysis, the minister is implementing the order of the supreme commander-in-chief to purge the army before the cabinet resigns. Nikolay Dobrev also said that the only thing the minister could do is to resign in a voluntary and dignified manner.

It is well known that the minister fell in love with the ancient Law on Comprehensive Military Service when the parliament began the second reading of the new bill. Aleksandrov expressed public satisfaction with he fact that he still commands on the basis of the old law. According to that law, which was adopted in 1958, the age limit for generals is 60, for colonels 50, and for lieutenant colonels 45. Before the parliament summer vacation, the BSP parliamentary faction was not able to organize the necessary majority for announcing a moratorium on the retirement and discharge of army officers until the new bill is adopted.

Colonels' Discharge Called Economic Problem

AU2908112994 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 24 Aug 94 p 4

[Commentary by Konstantin Subchev: "Rank and Money"]

[Text] The problem of the notorious discharge of the colonels threatens to become a new 100 Year War. Positano Stress No. 30 [headquarters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party] declared a total mobilization of its forces in an attempt to oust Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov.

Naturally, every political force would utilize such a case in order to create a good image among the military. It also is understandable that precisely the Bulgarian Socialist Party protects those born in the "glorious" year 1944. This is the last generation of Bulgarian officers for whom a strong imagination is needed in order to believe in their depoliticization. Apparently, this will be the line the Union of Democratic Forces will follow in its propaganda campaign.

However, in the final analysis, the problem is not political, but rather economic. Obviously, it is difficult to adapt to a pension after years of receiving a colonel's wage. Furthermore, the discharged colonels have almost no chance of finding a civilian job.

The Bulgarian officers deserve to have what their colleagues throughout the world have—a guaranteed social status after their retirement. Let the National Assembly members have the courtesy to provide such a status by finally adopting the Defense Bill rather than straining our nerves with cheap demagoguery.

Petrov Comments on Dispute With Defense Minister

AU2908115294 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 24 Aug 94 p 4

[Interview with Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, by Ognyan Stefanov; place

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and date not given: "Defense Minister's Decision Does Not Correspond to the Bulgarian Army's Combat Readiness"]

[Text] [Stefanov] The mass media again "revived" the issue of an alleged confrontation between the civilian and military leaderships of the Ministry of Defense. Actually what is it all about?

[Petrov] What do you mean by whether there is a confrontation between the military and civilian leaderships of the Ministry of Defense?

There is a new Constitution. There also is an old Law on Comprehensive Military Service. Finally, there is a new structure of the Ministry of Defense, coordinated with the new constitutional realities. It was approved by the president of the Republic of Bulgaria, as well as by the prime minister, the defense minister, and chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff.

As the chief of the General Staff, I observe the aforementioned normative documents strictly. I have never abused the prerogatives I have on the basis of those documents.

Thus, there could not be any talks about any confrontation.

However, there are concepts such as the reasonable sufficiency, management efficiency, combat readiness, and the troops' combat ability. In this context, I champion and will continue to champion the minimum requirements. Going below those requirements would render the existence of our army meaningless.

[Stefanov] One and a half days ago, Minister Aleksandrov said that he will not propose to discharge only the officers born in 1944 whose names appear on your list.

[Petrov] The new personnel decision announced by defense minister is his personal opinion and it does not commit the General Staff leadership in any way.

According to that decision, colonels who have completed their 51st, 52d, or 53d years should be discharged, simply because there are no older colonels.

[Stefanov] But should something not change in the army? Should officers not being discharged?

[Petrov] Yes, this is so. At the last meeting of the Supreme Military Council on 29 July, the minister issued specific instructions as to what officers of retirement age should be discharged, who shall be kept in military service, and what procedure should be followed. In implementing those instructions the military councils took place at the level of armies and at the level of commanders of the army branches and the chief of the General Staff. All colonels above the age of 50 were assessed. Within the prescribed term, I submitted to the minister a list of the names of those regarding whom I propose to exercise my prerogative and keep them in military service. The minister approved my proposal on 6 August. Afterward, proposals on a cadre reshuffle were made.

The present decision of the minister returns the work regarding the reshuffling the cadres in the army and especially in the commanding organs to its starting point. The solution of the issue has been postponed to an undetermined time. The issue should have been resolved by 1 September. This decision will certainly contribute to a new increase in tension in the army and to strengthening the officers' sense of insecurity.

[Stefanov] However, the minister's decision is a fact....

[Petrov] I do not know what considerations prompted the minister to adopt this decision. I can only say that it does not take into consideration our calculations regarding preserving the combat ability and readiness of the troops and the consistency of management in the senior staffs. This applies especially to the command of the military branches and armies. The relatively greater number of officers who must be discharged according to the decision of the defense minister are serving in the command of the branches and the staffs, which he adopted in connection with the list I proposed.

Article 2 of the Law on Comprehensive Military Service does not allow me to effect actions that contradict the military strength of our country.

Conflict Between Minister, Army Chief Outlined

AU2908143994 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 26 Aug 94 p 16

[Commentary by Lazar Tomov: "Exchange of Fire"]

[Text] The conflict between the civilian Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov and Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, has entered a new phase. So far, they associated through the press and by letters, and on 25 August it became obvious that they cannot physically stand each other. The fact that the conflict between the two is not only a personal matter, but also a dispute about the Army's future, is the only comforting factor.

According to the minister of defense, discharging the 275 colonels is the apex of the military reform. General Petrov, a professional soldier, maintains that this represents a violation of the national security and the army's combat ability. This is a formula that the Bulgarian Socialist Party used to repeat ad nausea and that contributed to the confusing situation created by the idea to announce a moratorium on discharging senior officers until the adoption of the new Defense Law. An attempt was even made to draw President Zhelev into the conflict.

At the same time, the adoption of the Defense Bill has already been postponed for four years, and the questions of the army's size, how to modernize the army, and how to feed the military remain unanswered.

Obviously, we will have to wait a long time before a military doctrine or concept is adopted. However, history teaches us

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that the state could expect nothing good when the military commanders begin to finger their holsters.

Petrov Invites Aleksandrov to News Conference

AU2908115694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, has sent the following letter to Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov:

On 25 August 1994 you removed me from your news conference. The media reports on the news conference explained your behavior and the reasons that you concealed this public appearance of yours from the leadership of the Bulgarian Army General Staff.

Utilizing my legal right to a reply, I hereby inform you that after returning from my official visit to Germany I will give a news conference. I invite you to participate in it.

Russian Minister on Gas Pipeline, Financing

AU3008074594 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 24 Aug 94 p 20

[Interview with Russian Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Oleg Davidov by Rumyana Tikholova; place and date not given: "Joint Construction Will Restore Traditional Bulgarian-Russian Relations"]

[Text] [Tikholova] Mr. Davidov, your visit was prompted by the agreement on constructing the transit gas pipeline through Bulgarian territory. Why is an intergovernmental agreement necessary for the establishment of a mixed Russian-Bulgarian company?

[Davidov] The agreement that we will sign is a continuation of a part of the agreements that were adopted two years ago. I think that the time has come for Russia and Bulgaria to establish lasting economic ties that will restore the traditional relations we lost in recent years for various reasons. I think that signing a intergovernmental agreement and forming a mixed company for the construction and exploitation of the gas pipeline are forms of restoring our traditional relations. In addition, this is a project with great scope, and every side could find its pragmatic interest in it. Some of the pipes will cross Bulgaria and reach Serbia, Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], and Greece. I think that, together with the Bulgarian organizations, we will be able to provide those countries with gas in a reliable manner, and maintain, repair, and utilize the gas pipeline. The joint investment project is a method of placing our relations on a new economic basis, something that will allow Russia to attract more construction investments. It will allow Bulgaria to provide more jobs and satisfy its gas needs. The project envisages the joint construction and exploitation of gas electric power stations in Bulgaria. The exploitation of the gas pipeline provides us with another opportunity to appear on the Bulgarian market again. Since it is connected with third countries, it will also allow us to establish more lasting economic relations with Greece and Turkey.

[Tikholova] You spoke about extending the previous agreements. According to them, Bulgargaz used to receive gas and had to invest in construction—something it did not do. Do you think that Bulgargaz is now capable of financing the construction?

[Davidov] Why only Bulgargaz? According to the project, the Bulgarian side must guarantee the reliable financing of the construction and exploitation, and in exchange you will receive gas.

[Tikholova] What is the volume of the investments in constructing the gas pipeline?

[Davidov] Several billion dollars will be needed for constructing, servicing, maintaining, and repairing the gas pipeline.

[Tikholova] Do you think that other companies, in addition to the mixed company's shareholders, could participate in financing the project?

[Davidov] So far, we have maintained categorically that this will only be Gazprom. As far as the construction of the section that crosses Bulgaria is concerned—the decision must be adopted by your government. Naturally, we, on the Russian side, are interested in attracting banks and associations that are Gazprom partners, and obtaining governmental guarantees. Those who supply the gas will be the partners on the Russian side, while in Bulgaria—those will be the factors involved in constructing and exploiting the pipeline. The important thing is to construct the facilities. Various partners could participate in the financing and investments after we commission the pipeline's actual track. Those who have the means and are ready to invest can do so. We will attract commercial banks in Russia to finance our part of the project.

[Tikholova] Why will only state companies participate in the project?

[Davidov] The Bulgarian Government controls the construction of the gas pipeline. This is in the interest of all society. If the pipeline is financed from your budget, it must belong to the people.

[Tikholova] Does the same requirement exists regarding the Russian shareholders in the company?

[Davidov] Yes. Gazprom, in which the state is the greatest shareholder, will participate in the project on the our side. The state has 40 percent of the Gazprom's shares. The other 60 percent are owned by former employees and current members of the Gazprom system. However, the relevant enterprises will be privatized.

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Revival of Economic Ties With Russia Foreseen

AU3008092294 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 27-28 Aug 94 p 4

[Commentary by Andrey Apostolov; "In a Fraternal or an Equal Manner"]

[Text] After a period in which our first politicians pretended that Moscow no longer existed and even planned a grand trial of the USSR, a detente of sorts in our bilateral relations emerged several months ago. Perhaps our politicians, dwelling in the Stalin-style concrete buildings in Sofia, finally grasped the obvious truth that Russia exists and that, unlike us, its former allies and opponents do not exclude it from their economic and political calculations. Perhaps they also understood that as long as we continue to turn around between the East and West, we are going to lose our traditional markets completely.

Obviously, the Kremlin also understood that a coup or two and a bit of flattery do not open the gates of paradise and its markets, and that it is high time to progress from disregard for the small fish in its former camp and empty presidential promises to something more tangible. Actually, this is what hundreds of prospering private companies of former comrades and present businessmen did, thus filling up the trade vacuums in both Bulgaria and Russia. Moscow has already done this with Hungary and the Czech Republic, which were far behind us in anything related to the fraternal love during the time of the general secretaries' kisses.

For us, the rediscovery of Russia is more realistic than the discovery of America. Let us hope that, in the period when the states divide the things in an equal rather than a fraternal manner, the possibility of revival will not be used to obtain political dividends, while pressure and influence will only be used when absolutely necessary. Indeed, the Kremlin demonstrated that it has grasped this truth, despite the fact that the same iron men continue to dwell behind its walls.

Ex-Communists Blamed for Economic Situation

AU2808202794 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 23 Aug 94 p 3

[Ivan Sokerov commentary: "'Socially-Minded' Bankers Are Defending the National Capital"]

[Text] Chaos and disorder, supported by the ruling circles, are prevailing in our country.

The beginning was marked under the so-called "government of hope" headed by Dimitur Popov, which increased food and consumer goods prices 10 times without compiling a list of the commodities stored in the state-owned warehouses. As a result of this irresponsible behavior in the economic sector, goods worth billions of leva were secretly stored in the country, while others were sold as a result of the already increasing prices in our country and abroad. The people were robbed of their honestly earned assets and rewarded with a few pennies. Where was the financial control which should have protected the interests of the state and the interests of the impoverished nation?

In talking about the totally illegal acquisition of state property, we should not omit to mention the companies established abroad on the basis of Decree No. 56, as a result of which God knows how many millions of dollars were transferred from the state to private communist individuals and to the so-called mixed companies. Numerous documents have been deliberately concealed and no investigation whatsoever is capable of discovering the thefts.

An unbearable foreign debt was also shifted onto our people's backs. Billions of leva have to be paid back, an event which the Berov government celebrated with champagne.

Now, to complete the total national disaster, the communists laid their criminal hands upon our independent judicial authorities. The leaders of the former Communist Party (called the Bulgarian Socialist Party today) have become "socially-minded bankers" and defenders of the "national" capital placed under the protection of "honest" private businessmen.

Unfortunate people! How long are you going to tolerate that such gangsters should rule over our country? It is high time for the nation to wake up from the lethargic sleep in which the Marxist communists have lulled our people for over 50 years!

The political scientist Mr. Nikola M. Nikolov, on behalf of an initiative committee, recently launched an appeal for the establishment of a nationwide patriotic movement. This is an encouraging fact. He urges that honest, worthy young people, ready to reform the state, should join our political life.

For the sake of millions of suffering people who were the victims of communist crimes leading us to the third national disaster, we should rally and rescue our motherland!

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Radio Head Wants RFE/RL To Use New Building

LD2608142494 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 26 Aug 94

[Text] Czech Radio Director General Vlastimil Jezek welcomes the U.S. Government and Congress decision to move the radio stations Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty [RFE/RL] to Prague. However, Vlastimil Jezek said he was unhappy about the fact that the building of the former federal parliament was being continuously mentioned as the future Prague headquarters of the RFE/RL while the offer by Czech Radio to lease about half of the radio center being built at Pankrac remains and presumably will remain ignored.

Klaus Discusses 'Agentomania,' Environment

AU3008070894 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 19 August 94 p 3

["Regular interview" with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci; place and date not given: "The Black and White Vision of the World Can No Longer Be Applied"]

[Text] [Krejci] After making the statement about your anxiety over the new stage of "agentomania" that offers alternative solutions to our transformation process, i.e., clashes with individual bearers of the evil of the communist regime rather than overcoming communism as a whole, a storm of criticism descended on your head. Allegedly, you are opposing the punishment of the criminals of the former regime. So, how is it?

[Klaus] I have not spoken about the criminals of the former regime but rather about what I called "agentomania." After all, the criminals of the former regime were somewhat different people, and it seems to me as oversimplifying the issue if we now confront precisely this one little group as a substitute. I only recalled the contemplation on how large should be the rearview mirror in relation to the size of the windshield through which we look forward. To magnify the rearview mirror as a substitute program, when there is no positive program, simply is dreadfully little, and that scares me.

[Krejci] So, you are in favor of punishing those whose guilt is proved?

[Klaus] How could I not be in favor of something like that? To me, it is absolutely incomprehensible how someone could have even gotten such an idea.

[Krejci] In this context, and with respect to Chemapol and Mr. Junek [CEO of the company accused of being former State Security agent], criticism has also emerged that you are lacking the important dimension of the geopolitical correlations. You are allegedly starting to construct the same doctrine of depolitization of the problems and struggle against the "agentomania" as once advocated by supporters of the Civic Forum.

[Klaus] I am not certain to whom I am reacting. Nevertheless, I am very much afraid that a tremendous trivialization is also occurring in this affair. I am trying for the opposite, i.e. a nontrivialization of the geopolitical correlations. The black and white vision of the world was relevant at the time of the communist regime, at the time of the division of the world into two halves. To apply it today, however, to the world that is not black and white is a childish expression of immaturity in understanding precisely these immensely important geopolitical correlations. To see in every contemporary Russian politician Stalin or Brezhnev, as I occasionally see done in the commentaries in our press, can only make me smile.

[Krejci] The government has not approved the material on principles and objectives of the government environment policy submitted by Minister Benda, and asked him to prepare a new draft of the structure of the material. Minister Benda claims, however, that he is unable to prepare a much better text than the rejected one. Allegedly, if you cannot reach an agreement, then, according to his own words, he has no place in this government. How do you feel about that?

[Klaus] The rejection of Minister Benda's material in the government really was categorical, and the expression of dissatisfaction was completely universal. To avoid the problem of formulating a rational policy of environmental protection by means of slogans that if one rejects the submitted material, he rejects the environmental protection, is a very false escape from responsibility. This material did not contain any clear description of the philosophy underlying the cabinet's approach to the issue. It does not contain results of an analysis that would indicate individual causes for the past or present degradation of the environment in the republic. As a result, it does not prioritize the methods, tools, and routes towards overcoming this state of affairs. The submitted document only supplies a long list of all kinds of things without ever stating what must be done today, what tomorrow, and what the next day. Thus, its adoption would not be a step forwards, after all.

The government particularly disagreed with the separation of the environment issue from its broader context. It is typical of some environment initiatives and, although I am convinced that it is not Mr. Benda's view, his actual concept has not come forward in this material. The government is convinced that the basic factor affecting the quality of our environment is the social system in which we move. The conscious government policy, which can add a little to this foundation, is just a complementary mechanism. We are deeply convinced that the dominant part in the effort to improve the environment belongs to the creation of a rational, i.e. nature preserving economic system. This system is a market economy based on private ownership and balanced prices. It also is the creation of a rational political system that facilitates, at the times when the government is making a decision, a rational social choice based on the opinion of citizens rather that of the elite of a

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political, or any other expert, even environment type. Thereby, we have done 1,000 times more work than all specific environment laws or activity of some environment associations can do. The submitted material did not reflect this, however, and therefore it also did not offer what type of superstructure the state should rationally implement.

[Krejci] As a result of the favorable development in foreign currency reserves, a discussion arose whether the koruna should be revaluated against the convertible currencies.

[Klaus] The fundamental concept of our economic strategy has a built-in principle of a firm currency exchange rate that is the only fixed, Archimedean point, which—like an anchor—holds our economic system and does not allow us to take off in nominal values. The principal reason why we need the firm rate is the fact that the transformation is still in progress. A corollary reason is the awareness that the firm nominal rate means infirm real rate, which means incessant real appreciation of the Czech koruna. This appreciation—in comparison with the devaluation moment in 1990—has reached approximately 80 percent. Thus: The definitive settlement will really take place at the end of the transformation process, and at the moment when our rate of inflation will equal that of neighboring countries. Otherwise we would be subject to continuous devaluation, as we see happen even in such countries as Poland or Hungary, which devalue several times per year. We, on the other hand, with our fixed exchange rate, hold the economy on a different plane than that to which the economy of Poland or Hungary is slipping.

Left Bloc Assesses Klaus's Balanced Budget Plan

LD2908175994 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Excerpts] The Czech opposition Left Bloc [LB] deputies' club met in the parliament building today. Among other things, its members expressed their views on Friday's resolution by the Executive Council of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS]. Ivana Anyzova spoke to Josef Hajek, a parliamentary deputy and member of the LB Executive.

[Begin recording] [Anyzova] What do you think of the ODS Executive Council proposal to draft a constitutional law requiring a balanced state budget.

[Hajek] We consider it to be an important political statement and by no means do we intend to be among those who respond with some kind of irony to this proposal or dismiss it lightly. I think that a number of politicians have failed to realize what this is all about. This statement goes way beyond the merely budgetary or fiscal level. It is a statement which responds and must respond to the present situation in the economy.

[Anyzova] Do you consider the proposal for a constitutional law on compulsorily balanced state budgets to extend beyond economics?

[Hajek] Definitely. I see a danger in that this could raise the question of autonomy in fiscal decisionmaking among lower territorial units, namely municipalities. Existing budget regulations permit the passing of any kind of budget at municipal level, or a surplus, balanced or deficit. There would be no sense in implementing one method at national level and to allow a free hand at lower levels, because the state budget is always in fact put together and evaluated in the form of (?hundreds) of public budgets, and municipal budgets are among them.

For us, the LB, this declaration confirms the fact that the most powerful ruling political party is aware of the revenue problems in the budget, which means that this economy is unable to produce enough to approve a balanced budget without certain social consequences. Another important signal is that the most powerful party, and therefore also the government, has no alternative other than to wait for the all-powerful, invisible hand of the market to suddenly produce some kind of affluence. [passage omitted]

[Anyzova] Do you think this is a sign of a further deepening of the crisis within the coalition?

[Hajek] I think that this is above all a signal from the ODS to the coalition and not to the opposition. Here the premier could not have expected any great support or anything other than a negative reaction. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Handling Smuggled Radioactive Material Alleged

AU2908142794 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 25 Aug 94 p 5

[TA SR report: "Nuclear Crime; Secret Activities in Czech Labs; Dangerous Material Seized and 33 Cases Investigated"]

[Excerpt] Prague—"We suspect that employees of some Czech laboratories might be secretly involved in ascertaining the quality of smuggled radioactive substances. In view of continuing investigations, however, it is not possible to provide any details for the time being," Colonel K. Klastersky, head of the Nuclear Crime Department operating under the Central Criminal Police of the Czech Republic, told the daily ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY.

According to K. Klastersky, there exist several dozen well-equipped laboratories in the Czech Republic that have the technical capacity to make analyses for the needs of nuclear smugglers.

The Czech Republic was the first East European country to set up a special department to combat the growing nuclear crime, the daily says.

In the 18 months of the department's operations, its staff has seized nuclear material in three cases and investigated 33 cases. [passage omitted]

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Nuclear Material Allegedly Smuggled in 1991

AU3008113294 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 Aug 94 p 1

["gag, il"-attributed report: "The Czech Republic Cannot Avoid Nuclear Crime"]

[Text] Prague—Nuclear crime, which has again become a topic for discussion after the recent seizure of 300 grams of smuggled plutonium 239 at Munich airport, affected Czechoslovakia for the first time shortly before its partition. LIDOVE NOVINY obtained this information from the special services analysts.

An Interior Ministry rapid deployment unit and military police were deployed at Mosnov Airport on 29 August 1991. The impetus for the action was a report that containers with so-called red mercury were allegedly concealed in the hangars. This substance is unknown, however, to the physicists of the Rez Nuclear Research Institute, for instance, and they describe it as nonsense, although the then federal ministers of the interior and defense used its existence to explained the Mosnov action. The ruthless intervention did not, however, bring any results—the red mercury was not found, and the people who were supposed to transport it across the Czech territory were not detained. Speculation emerged immediately thereafter about whether the intelligence services of the Interior Ministry and the army had not been the victims of a provocation. LIDOVE NOVINY information from sources close to intelligence circles indicates that is a definite possibility. The provocation was apparently prepared through a Czech citizen by several officers of the former Soviet Central Group troops who cleaned up after the Soviet Army in Olomouc. The Ministries of the Interior and Defense justified their conduct in the defense of the action by having obtained reports from several mutually independent sources. It is only emerging now that it was not true. It was a single, moreover questionable source. The special services analysts are convinced that the motive for the provocation was to check their capability, the possibilitiesy for disinformers, and also to map the optimum transition channels. A genuine transaction allegedly took place concurrently with the provocation, and it was perfectly camouflaged by the Mosnov chaos. It could have been the transport of fissionable material or USSR military technology, in which the heads of the local secret services began to trade ahead of the others. The smuggling of decagram quantities of plutonium 239 (the Munich detection) is described by both scientists and intelligence agents as "chuckle crime" in comparison with the several year old deals involving dozens of kilograms of fissionable substances. They admit, however, that the intercepted grams may serve as samples that would be followed by larger shipments, or it might be just a search for illegal trade routes.

Minister's Attitude, Army's Role Criticized

AU2908113094 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 18 Aug 94 p 4

[Commentary by Katerina Perknerova: "Does the Czech Army Have a Defense Capability?"]

[Text] I can imagine numerous questions to which the defense minister would not be able to respond immediately and in detail. If someone asks him, however, whether the Czech Army would be capable of defending the country if necessary, the citizens should be able to obtain an exhaustive answer, particularly as Antonin Baudys (KDU- CSL) [Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party] is convinced that the Army is well prepared for its fundamental task. On the Sunday television program Debata, however, the minister again demonstrated—I believe—that he most likely does not know what he is talking about. Namely, he supports his masterful affirmative answer regarding the striking power of the Army by the facts, for instance, that bilateral exercises with France and Netherlands at the level of companies were successful, that the Czech UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] unit in Yugoslavia is among the best, that our reconnaissance scouts won an international competition, or that a Czech officer answered the Canadian defense minister questions about some expert details to the latter's satisfaction.

I am not saying that all this should be overlooked, but it has nothing to do with the readiness of the Army. If Baudys wanted to explain the situation of the Czech Army today responsibly, he would have to begin somewhere else. One of the plausible beginnings would be to say how many companies, battalions, and brigades at the West and Center Commands—the decisive Army branches—have full complements, if they train regularly, how often the soldiers shoot tank and combat vehicle weapons, machine guns, assault rifles, or pistols each month, how many kilometers the soldiers drive within the framework of combat training on the special driving ranges, how many flight hours the pilots execute, and how many jumps the paratroopers carry out. He should speak about how many combat shooting exercises have been conducted over the past year with the participation of the higher tactical unit troops as the culmination of the training and the basis for the coordination and combat readiness of the units. He would have to mention the actual state of the teaching and training basis in the garrisons and military training zones, the technical state of the combat, special, and transportation technology, the standard of provision for the mobilization, selection, call up, and training of reservists.

Moreover, Minister Baudys omitted to state how many young people graduate from military schools and are transferred to units every year, what professional criteria are applied in the selection for posts on the General Staff, and whether they include a requirement for extensive service experience in the field, as is the case in the U.S. and German Armies. Furthermore, does he really

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believe that several-month-long language courses in the West will transform the officers into top-notch professionals?

These key questions remain unanswered. I fear that the reason is either Baudys's inability to orientate himself in military affairs or—which would be much worse—his thorough knowledge of the situation. I have visited several units myself, spoke with several commanders, and learned that wherever one looks, something is wrong. One can start the list with untidy, sometimes intoxicated soldiers and end with the minimal training of the troops. I derived from this that the combat readiness of the army is pathetic, and if, Lord forbid, an intervention by the Czech Army were necessary, even a few companies ready for immediate combat would probably not be able to assemble. Thus, it is not surprising that the prestige of the army continues to drop in the public's perception, that there are ever fewer students interested in enrollment in military schools, and that the lack of discipline in the army at times culminates in fatal injuries or, ever more frequently, the theft of arms and material. If Baudys refers to officers by the derogatory name of "lampasak" [colloquial disparaging term for an officer] and refers to them in degrading terms if they are older than 40 years, it is logical that even the best ones, like the pilots, are leaving the Czech Army. They are also leaving the service because there is a dearth of military housing in the garrisons as the existing units were transferred to municipal ownership, and new ones are not being built.

Baudys's frequent trips abroad or his shooting, which is nearing perfection, are certainly not helping to improve the state of the Czech Army. The minister may dismiss this with a wave of his hand because an external threat really is not on the agenda. If that is so, however, we can say that we are keeping the army only to be able to join NATO in the future, but its actual deployment in combat is not expected, and therefore the situation is such as it is. If that is the case, why should we spend a lot of money for its transformation and modernization?

Daily Reports on Number, Prices of Firearms Sold

AU2908203694 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 19 Aug 94 p 1

[Jan Kreuzer, Petr Bakovsky report: "Almost 100,000 People in the Republic Keep Arms Legally, and Twice as Many Illegally"]

[Text] There are currently almost 100,000 short-barrelled firearms, i.e., pistols or revolvers, legally kept in the Czech Republic. The precise figure for the illegally kept arms is not known, but the estimate is at least twice the number of legally kept weapons. Certain sources report, however, as many as 400,000 "black weapons." The interest in obtaining a weapon is not abating. In Prague alone, the police issued twice as many purchase permits as in 1992.

Although it is the wealthier people that acquire arms, salesmen confirm interest in the cheaper types of revolvers and pistols. The price of most demanded arms hovers between 6,000 and 12,000 Czech korunas [Ck]. The more expensive arms, priced Ck18,000 and up, also sell relatively well, and interest exists even in weapons that sell for Ck50,000 or Ck60,000, for instance. Perhaps the most expensive are special sport arms, the price of which even exceeds Ck100,000. People who obtain their arms illegally need about one-half of these amounts. Hence, one can acquire a handgun for as little as Ck3,000. Nevertheless, a true professional seeks only a new weapon, which is somewhat costlier. He has the certainty, however, that no crime has been committed with it, of which he could be accused if detained. The most notorious in the sphere are various flea markets, above all those where military historical relics are sold. One such place is Bustehrad near Prague, where illegal deals are conducted early in the morning, before the market opens, or at night, after closing. The foreigner gangs on Wenceslas Square in Prague also deal in weapons. Even submachine guns or other rapid-fire guns, for which a legal purchase permit cannot be obtained, are available. A version of the Russian Kalashnikov, used in the Czech Army, costs between Ck10,000 and Ck15,000 on the black market. The price of some special arms with quality telescopic sights can, however, reach even Ck40,000 and more.

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Moravcik Interviewed About Economics, SNP

LD2608182694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 26 Aug 94

[Regular Friday interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik by correspondent Lydia Mrazova in Bratislava on 26 August—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Mrazova] A day after your appointment to the post of prime minister you said, I quote: We have to concentrate above all on the most painful issues, and there is no doubt they are in the sphere of the economy. Do you think the economy is a less painful issue after six months in office?

[Moravcik] I think so, because there are clear signals of the revival of economic activities. This is revealed by statistical data. According to these data, gross domestic product has grown by about 5 percent. This is a very interesting and important figure.

On the other hand, it is necessary to say that a certain decline in investment activities is continuing. In order to achieve better parameters-more favorable figures—in this sphere, it is necessary to implement the projects that we intend to start and for which we have created space in the law on the state budget. We have released about 4 billion crowns from the National Property Fund for these development programs.

Hard currency reserves have been increasing. We have managed to remove or to create conditions for removing tension within the state budget, though this has been at a rather heavy cost because we have had to decide to increase—we want to take the step to increase—some taxes. This is very important because a deficit in last year's state budget has had and is now having a very negative impact. We have created conditions to prevent an increase of the state budget deficit such as the one that occurred last year. This is very important. For instance, while drafting next year's budget, it has emerged that state debt servicing, linked to the level of the state budget deficit, amounts to 42 billion crowns. This is why it was necessary to take these measures.

Whatever it was possible to do within this short term, we have attempted to do and have done. [passage omitted]

[Mrazova] The central celebrations of the Slovak National Uprising [SNP] will be held in Banska Bystrica on 27 August. There is a certain moral dimension to this anniversary, since the world powers acknowledged the SNP after the war as a moral insurgence of this nation against fascism, which is one of the reasons why we were not included among the countries that paid war reparations. However, until now there have been circles that try to present the SNP as a communist putsch. What is your view of this anniversary?

[Moravcik] The SNP was a reaction to a certain political power, to a certain way of ruling. It was a rejection of the political style that was being implemented in the Slovak Republic [as heard] during the Second World War, and it is very important for the history of the Slovak nation. We have to build on this, since it is the SNP that links us with the values on which democracy, stability, and prosperity in Europe are anchored.

Moravcik Evaluates Talks With Ukraine Leader

LD2708211494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1930 GMT 27 Aug 94

[Excerpt] Foreign guests taking part in the celebrations commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising in Banska Bystrica met in a number of sessions for bilateral talks. Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik evaluated these sessions at a news conference:

[Begin Moravcik recording] My talks during the day were all very important for us. We used this as an opportunity to maintain contacts. Some of the meetings were, in fact, taking place for the first time. For example, this was the first meeting in the Slovak Republic of Slovak and Ukrainian prime ministers. Each of the meetings was specific in a sense. We were unable to go into any depth, because we had rather limited time. We did, however, bring up some of the most pressing matters, such as—in the case of relations with Ukraine—the problem of border crossings, which has been on our minds for some time. The prime minister of Ukraine is of the opinion that we can now resolve these problems, so I expect things to start moving. If that were to happen, it would be a very valuable result of these talks. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Foreign Minister Denies Diplomatic Purge

AU3008110994 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 25 Aug 94 pp 1, 13

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan by Boris Latta and Ctibor Brezak; place and date not given: "Purges Among Diplomats Are Nonsense"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [SMENA] One Slovak periodical claims that you are making purges in your department and installing "Moravcikites."

[Kukan] So far, I have always used diplomatic language and it is possible that not everyone has fully understood this language. I will now put diplomatic language aside and will tell you what I think. The article you are alluding to is incompetently written. For example, it uses the term diplomatic corps, which comprises diplomats working in our country. But let us return to the "purge." To talk about purges in my department is nonsense. This specific case involved the routine recalling of two ambassadors. We maintain 55 representative missions, six permanent missions, and five general consulates abroad. Looking at it from the mathematical viewpoint, we are talking about a negligible percentage. Slovakia is a young state and the same goes for its diplomacy. In the past we were therefore forced to fill ambassadorial posts with

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people who did not always have the requisite qualifications. Ambassadors used to be selected from among journalists, artists, and actors.... Not all of them have acquitted themselves well in diplomatic work. The two cases of recalled ambassadors only confirm that. They did not assert themselves as ambassadors. The whole process of recalling them takes the normal, discreet course. We have not published their names anywhere. Unfortunately, the method they chose, scandalization, will only cause damage to themselves. The people involved are intelligent people. They both have a profession in which they can continue working. We do not yet have any replacement for the two recalled ambassadors and are not about to dispatch anyone to replace them. Does this amount to the installation of "Moravcikites"? [passage omitted]

[SMENA] Governments in our country change too frequently and, by the same token, our diplomats abroad. How could this "disease" be prevented?

[Kukan] Our aim is to have career diplomats form the backbone of Slovak foreign service. Such is the established system in most countries, the so-called civil service [preceding two words published in English]. In Poland, for example, this system has already been presented in the parliament. The ministerial apparatus, including the deputy minister or the secretary general, does not change regardless of the outcome of elections and of who becomes minister. After all, the ministry must function all the time. This is also our aim with regard to my department. As for the filling of ambassadorial posts, most countries have professional diplomats. There are also countries whose ambassadors are political nominees. Countries that have enough staff at their embassies can afford this. An ambassador who is a political nominee can then avail himself of professional diplomats. This is not so for us. Often we have two or three people working at our embassies and cannot afford this luxury. [passage omitted]

[SMENA] According to unverified information at our disposal, in your absence some of your subordinates "give an opportunity" to your state secretary to decide on important issues. They know about your strictness and adherence to principles and opt for the path of least resistance. Is that true?

[Kukan] That information is news to me. It is absolutely normal for the state secretary to process everyday, routine matters when he stands in for the minister. I doubt that anything is going on behind my back because I fully rely on the state secretary. He himself is the guarantee that nothing of that sort would happen.

[SMENA] In the past, there were people working at our representative missions abroad who were accountable to another ministry.... What is the situation now?

[Kukan] We used to say that they are from the Ministry of Agriculture. Today there are only employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at our representative missions. And if they are from another ministry, the host country knows about it. For example, in Vienna we have a liaison officer from the Ministry of the Interior, of whom the Austrian side has been officially informed. [passage omitted]

[SMENA] Since November 1989, many compatriots have expressed interest in obtaining Slovak citizenship, but they are encountering a number of bureaucratic problems....

[Kukan] I know this problem very well from the time of my diplomatic stay in the United States, where I had good contacts with our compatriots. The main obstacle is the existing Agreement on Naturalization of 1928, under which he who obtains the citizenship of another state automatically loses his original citizenship. Slovak authorities are very benevolent in that regard. We do not demand that those who apply for Slovak citizenship furnish evidence about the termination of the original citizenship. In spite of that, a systemic solution to this problem is necessary. We are now negotiating with the United States on the cancellation of the above agreement. It is a process that will take some time; it will continue in October with the next round of negotiations. This is the way to resolve a long-lasting problem and to eliminate the unpleasant feeling of compatriots in their home country where, for example, they pay more for a hotel than do domestic guests.

Pittner Views Country's Role in Nuclear Smuggling

AU3008074994 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 25 Aug 94 p 3

[CTK report: "Slovakia on the Radioactive Route? Interior Minister Pittner on Smuggling of Nuclear Material"]

[Text] Bratislava—Slovak Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner estimates that there are in Central and Eastern Europe more than three kilograms of plutonium that could be used to make a nuclear weapon.

As he told a CTK correspondent yesterday, no cases of trading in radioactive materials had been detected in Slovakia in the past, but information from intelligence sources suggests that Slovakia is on the route, along which this material is being transported to the West. "Yet there is no evidence," Pittner added. He himself subscribes to the opinion that those dangerous substances most probably originate from the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Regarding the detention of four Slovaks and one Czech citizen by the German police in July (they attempted to sell 600 grams of low- enriched uranium and were said to have possessed 0.8 grams of highly enriched uranium 235), the Slovak minister assumes that they were merely offering samples, on the basis of which a larger-scale deal was to be mediated. In view of the ongoing investigations of this case, he refused to provide any more details. He

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noted, however, that the Slovak authorities have contacted the appropriate agencies of "friendly states" in this matter, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Jaroslav Ivor, director of the Slovak Interior Ministry's Office of Investigations, told CTK that two cases of unauthorized manipulation with, and trading in, nuclear material were uncovered in Slovakia in the past. The first case involved a few grams of uranium 235 originating from the Jachymov uranium mines in north Bohemia. "The investigations of both cases have been wound up and the court should now decide on them," Jaroslav Ivor said.

President Appoints, Promotes Army Generals

AU3008081194 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 25 Aug 94 p 1

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA report: "Promotion and Appointment of Generals"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—The president of the republic appointed new generals of the Army of the Slovak Republic [ASR], at the recommendation of the Slovak Government, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising:

Colonel of General Staff Rudolf Zidek, head of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic Office; Colonel of the General Staff Emil Vestenicky, commander of ASR Ground Forces; and Colonel of the General Staff Leopold Bilcik, director of the Logistics Section at the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic were promoted to the rank of major general. [passage omitted]

Major General Andrej Sabol, state secretary at the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. [passage omitted]

The president of the Slovak Republic also appointed generals of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic: Colonel Ladislav Pittner, candidate of sciences, minister of interior of the Slovak Republic; Colonel Stefan Lastovka, LLD, president of the Police Corps; Colonel Jan Michalko, LLD, head of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic Office; and Colonel Jaroslav Ivor, LLD, candidate of sciences, director of the Police Corps' Office of Investigations.

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Defense Minister Views Military Tasks, Prospects

AU2908201794 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 27 Aug 94 p 4

[Interview with Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Jozsef Danyi; place and date not given: "The Army Should Be Above Politics"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Danyi] You recently pointed out that there are three basic sources of danger threatening our security policy: Dangers deriving from the differing size of the regular armies of individual countries, and dangers deriving from national minority conflicts and civil wars. The migration of people in our region also represents a source of danger for our security. What is your opinion about this list and how do these factors influence the Army's tasks?

[Keleti] I indeed spoke about the sources of danger but, naturally, I expressed our joint opinion coordinated with the Alliance of Free Democrats. I said that an armed conflict between regular armies would mean an interstate war in the traditional sense of the word, but the probability of such a conflict is extremely low today. The dangers coming from civil wars are real, but generally these dangers are not so serious as to reach the threshold of war. I think that, given the nature of things, Hungary is not facing the danger of a war today, and civil wars generally do not turn into wars against another country. However, the civil war in Yugoslavia has had events connected with Hungary, like the violation of our airspace and the approach of an unidentified aircraft from the south which bombed Barcs. Such dangers still exist: Armed groups could cross into Hungary, and processes connected with the smuggling of arms could increase. Thus, the threat might increase in the given areas, and the Hungarian Army might have to interfere if the Border Police and the police are no longer able to deal with the situation. According to some evaluations, there is a danger that combat activity might again come close to the Hungarian border. The territorial debates between the Serbs and the Croats have not yet ended, and both sides gained war experiences. Although all this does not yet represent a concrete threat to us, we cannot disregard them and fail to prepare. [passage omitted]

We do not regard any neighboring country as our enemy, but we must prepare for possible violation of our airspace when a civil war erupts somewhere in this region. In such cases, we strengthen our radar surveillance, place the Air Force on an adequate combat readiness, and mobilize a determined number of aircraft. [passage omitted]

[Danyi] At a recent staff meeting of the Defense Ministry and the Hungarian Army, President Arpad Goncz pointed out that the government change would not affect the pace of reorganization that has begun in the Army. What development and reorganization tasks are demanded by the need to join NATO, the need to maintain military security, and the limited budget resources?

[Keleti] I find it natural that a continuity remains after the change in the government, and that the forms of military cooperation and agreements signed with the armies of neighboring countries continue to be valid. I assured the defense ministers of the neighboring countries of this during my talks. I also told the commander of NATO troops in Europe that the new government program also contains our determination to join NATO, and we continue to agree with the pace of this process and with the peace partnership. In my opinion, the most important thing for us is to be able to make the necessary changes for all this, namely to carry out the important steps of developing our Army. This is primarily an economic matter. Unfortunately, it is absolutely clear that our current Army structure cannot be financed; therefore, we need a so- called crisis management program also stipulated in the coalition agreement. We must get through this year and the next. Today, the Army has financial difficulties, in the real sense of the word, and we cannot think of a major development and modernization as long as we have trouble in paying for wages, food, clothes, and electric power. [passage omitted]

We are planning to reduce the number of various headquarters and to transfer the available officers to the units. We would like to achieve a 70-80 percent level of warrant officers in our units, because we now have units where the percentage is much lower. We are planning to develop two military zones out of the current four and to eliminate some headquarters. We would like to reduce the number of background institutions and to eliminate or reorganize institutions that overlap each other. [passage omitted]

Finance Minister on Economic Prospects, Tasks

AU3008104194 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 29 Aug 94 p 4

["H.A."-signed interview with Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi in Gyula on 28 August: "We Will Have To Live Economically in 1996 Too"]

[Text] [MAGYAR HIRLAP] Is it true that, within your party's parliamentary group, there are deputies who would like to "soften" your tough economic program?

[Bekesi] I have not come across any such attempt, as responsible and calm speeches were delivered here by people who are well aware of the situation. Although there were people who spoke on behalf of the society or of individual professional interests, there was no real attempt to bring about a so-called softening of the program. Our parliamentary group finds it necessary to have more differentiated evaluations and certain priorities even in the current difficult situation, and this is foreign neither to the government nor to me, within the general framework of the economic program. Therefore,

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we should not overstep the distribution frameworks determined by the balance. However, within this limit, one must and can differentiate. Thus, I did not feel anything of what the press threatened, namely that the finance minister will be eaten up with knives and forks at this meeting.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Peter Boross made repeated statements according to which the cabinet would ease the tough economic measures to make the impression that it was making concessions to the trade unions and, thus, it could play the role of a good government.

[Bekesi] This is a totally mistaken speculation. We would not do this even if we had the opportunity to do so. On the contrary. Indeed, in a very tense situation, we must go to the limit; that is, we will only submit essential proposals to Parliament. Unfortunately, there are no reserves that would enable bargaining. If we have to make concessions nevertheless, and this is possible because there is no agreement without compromises, we will have to seek resources.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] It is becoming increasingly obvious that people are becoming poorer by the day in Bekes county. When will there be a turn for the better?

[Bekesi] If we have sufficient determination and courage now, we will be able to carry out what we decided upon in our program, with the condition that we get support for this action. Of course, we do not need so much courage because we must not risk anything now; instead, we must go for the sure thing. All we ask is enough patience to be able to use the year 1995 to stabilize the economy. We will no longer have to count on such tough measures in 1996, but we will still have to live economically in that year too. By 1997, everyone will feel the economic growth.

MSZP Official Interviewed About Coalition

AU2908152894 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Aug 94 pp 1,4

[Interview with Imre Szekeres, administrative deputy chairman and Assembly group leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Imre Bednarik; place and date not given: "According to Szekeres, There Are Only a Few Coalition Conflicts"]

[Text] The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] has a broad view on the freedom of its politicians to form their own views, however, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] insists on a stricter attitude, and this can be derived from the different political traditions of the two parties—this is the explanation given by Imre Szekeres for the background of the differences of views in the coalition.

[Bednarik] We have witnessed the first really serious clash in the coalition. In his 20 August speech, Gyula Horn spoke about the possibility of introducing a property tax and Ivan Peto rejected this categorically. This "intermezzo" raises the question: To what extent can the coalition parties and politicians form their opinions independently?

[Szekeres] The tradition of coalition cooperation can establish the freedom of parties and politicians to form their own opinion. The MSZP has a broad view on its politicians' room for maneuver. They are free to raise ideas, even if these are not part of the government program or if they are an alternative to it. On the other hand, the SZDSZ requires a stricter conduct, in its view, all issues that can have political consequences have to be coordinated between the coalition partners. This difference stems from the different political traditions. Some time has to be allowed for a normal balance to evolve in the coalition.

[Bednarik] Peto said that he cannot imagine a casting of roles in the coalition whereby the prime minister publicly formulates the popular, but unfeasible measures while the finance minister or the smaller coalition partner are left with the task of presenting the unpleasant, but feasible measures....

[Szekeres] I partly disagree with Peto's view. Due to their roles, the prime minister and the finance minister have different tasks and responsibilities.

While Horn has to integrate all views when the pension increases are discussed, Laszlo Bekesi's task is to harmonize the outcome of the government debates with the country's economic situation. The final decisions will, in all probability, be made after serious "battles," but we will eventually become accustomed to this. On the other hand, if the prime minister of a coalition government does or says something that is accepted by the people it then creates moral capital for the joint government rather than for his own party.

[Bednarik] Before the signing of the coalition agreement, some MSZP members also opposed the coalition because, they said, the smaller coalition partner had a realistic chance to make its will prevail to a larger extent than justified by its election results. Have the problems in the operation so far justified these arguments?

[Szekeres] As opposed to the former coalition's practice, the MSZP strives for joint governing. This means joint decisions and responsibility. The decisions will be based on compromises, rather than on the one-sided will of one of the parties.

[Bednarik] Have the past six weeks justified the MSZP's basic stance, namely that it was necessary to form a coalition with the SZDSZ, even in possession of a parliamentary majority?

[Szekeres] Under calm circumstances, we might have been able to govern with a 54 percent majority, but not in this crisis situation. I admit that I myself did not think the coalition would be able to function so well. We have few conflicts, especially if we consider that two parties that did not have political cooperation in the past are

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governing together. I continue to maintain that the coalition was necessary and unavoidable because society's decisive majority wanted the MSZP-SZDSZ government. On the other hand, the MSZP is aware of the fact that, in the long run, it can only guarantee a stable government on the basis of a definite parliamentary majority. It is nonsense that the MSZP only offered the coalition to the SZDSZ to be better accepted by the world and the Hungarian media.

[Bednarik] What effect can it have on the two parties' relations that they will again compete against each other at the local government elections?

[Szekeres] It is impossible to see this at the moment. At the local elections, the MSZP would like to have its social support measured completely independently. Therefore, it will set parliamentary and mayoral candidates everywhere. After the elections, there is a realistic chance for the majority of local governments to also form Socialist-Free Democrat coalitions. However, the style of the election campaign can largely determine the type of cooperation. Therefore, we would also like to include this subject on the coalition coordination council's agenda. We have to make society accept that, although the MSZP and the SZDSZ have a joint government, they are rivals at the local government elections.

[Bednarik] The governmental coordination mechanisms are already in operation. Are you planning for the two parties' parliamentary groups to also determine the framework of cooperation?

[Szekeres] With Peto, we are in the process of drawing up the organizational framework of concrete cooperation. We are aware that it will be very significant politically whether the two parliamentary groups vote in unison on given issues. We have to find the linking points between the parliamentary groups and the government. So far, the government deputies have mostly only been able to see the bills submitted by the government at the parliament's plenary session for the first time. According to our plans, the coalition deputies will be able to become familiar with the texts of bills well before they are submitted to the parliament, thus leaving time for debates and possible amendments. This way, government party deputies will not be submitting dozens of amendment motions to the government proposals.

[Bednarik] The two parties might lose their separate identities for the public.

[Szekeres] This is a real danger. The signs of this have not appeared yet because certain tensions have already established the two parties' different profiles. In the MSZP's view, two sovereign parties have formed the coalition and we would like both parties to preserve their special image. It is by no accident that we always mention Socialist-Liberal cooperation rather than a social-liberal coalition. This is the undertaking of two autonomous parties for joint governing. That is all. No more and no less.

[Bednarik] Will it be possible to cross over between the two parliamentary groups?

[Szekeres] It will in the working groups. However, it is out of the question for the deputies to migrate from one government party's parliamentary group to another. As early as at the time of nominating the deputies, we clarified that, in addition to their individual qualities, the fact that they represent the Socialist Party's policies might also contribute to their election. It would be a deception of the electorate if a Socialist deputy joined another parliamentary group, even if this was the parliamentary group of the Free Democrats.

MDF Official Views Alternatives for Party

AU3008110294 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 27 Aug 94 p 7

[Interview with Ivan Szabo, Assembly group leader of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Gabriel Oszy-Toth; place and date not given: "If the MDF Moves to the Right, It Has No Chance of Survival—Ivan Szabo on the Situation of the Parliamentary Group and the Party, Opposition to Expo, and the OTP Raising Its Capital"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Oszy-Toth] You are a member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum's [MDF] temporary executive committee, and the party's parliamentary group elected you its chairman. What kind of image will the new MDF parliamentary group have?

[Szabo] I would like the MDF to present a united image in the parliament and not make statements that are contradictory to each other. I have instructed the press department to collect the press interviews with our parliamentary group members. These will be presented to the people involved and to me and we will make weekly analyses from them. [passage omitted]

[Oszy-Toth] In your view, is it necessary for the opposition parties to cooperate?

[Szabo] All parties intend to create their own separate image and they will certainly have an independent view on certain issues. I believe that the Smallholders' Party will mainly take a stand on agricultural policy that might not be followed by the others. The Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] also presents a marked and unique opinion with its opposition to the world expo. With the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], we would like to have close cooperation but differences might appear on certain—mainly economic and social policy—issues. Because of its voter base alone, the KDNP is bound to be less open on certain economic issues than the MDF. However, these will probably be exceptions because Parliament rarely has theoretical political debates. Through coordination, joint voting can be assumed on the various bills, tax bills, and budget issues. [passage omitted]

[Oszy-Toth] During the period the new government has been in office the decision that caused the biggest debate was the cancellation of the world expo. Was the cabinet right in its decision?

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[Szabo] In my view, the real problem lies in the fact that opposition to the expo—and this is where the coalition partners must have come to an agreement—fits into the image of society that is suggested by their other measures. The Free Democrats look at the economy from the viewpoint of the big bourgeoisie, the financial oligarchy, and international monopoly capital. This is where they see the pulling force. They support the economic elite and they have become the representatives of this group's interests. The Socialists on the other hand have declared that they are the party of the low-wage earners, ordinary people living on wages and salaries. The expo is not in the interest of either of these social groups. The expo has a message for the small and medium-size enterprises. Support for the rising middle classes does not fit into this government's view of society. This cabinet thinks in terms of big capital versus hired labor rather than in terms of the political and economic middle classes. [passage omitted]

[Oszy-Toth] The nominations for chairman have ended in the MDF, you were supported by 105 local organizations, and you received the second largest number of nominations after Lajos Fur. Have you thought of withdrawing?

[Szabo] If everyone resigned to benefit one candidate, it could give the impression to our local organizations that we are arranging a big con here and we decide what happens regardless of what they say. After our serious election defeat, the executive committee cannot limit the membership in its choice. In addition to us two, Peter Boross and Sandor Lezsak also have the support of several local organizations. One cannot predict whom the delegates will elect at our national meeting at the end of September.

[Oszy-Toth] Do you think that it will divide the MDF's membership if they have to choose between you and Fur? You two received the most nominations.

[Szabo] If there is no tension between the two of us because of this, then the membership certainly will not be divided. [passage omitted]

[Oszy-Toth] How do you see the future of the MDF? On the one hand, are you not afraid that the party might fall to pieces in opposition during the next four years and, on the other, is it possible for you to merge with the opposition parties to form a Christian national side?

[Szabo] This is an interesting issue that we also think about every day. In preparing for the national meeting, the national committee set up a fact-finding committee—headed by Csaba Ferenc—which is also to present a view of the future. The material they prepared essentially shows two alternatives for the MDF. One is an MDF that is more radical in its rhetoric and style against the left-wing government, an MDF that will sooner or later question even the basic values and, I quote, will create national slogans with a great clamour.... This carries the danger of destruction. Everyone can remember when Istvan Csurka stuck a great big boundary pole in the soil in 1992 and wrote the slogan of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party on it. In 1994, a number was also written on the pole, namely 1.59 percent, the result of the parliamentary elections. On the far side of this boundary pole lies a political no man's land, an uninhabited area. If the MDF wishes to go in this direction with its 11.5 percent, it might meet the same fate as the river in the desert that does not get to the ocean because the sand soaks it all up.

The other alternative is that the MDF turns into a center party mainly based on middle class social development, a party that has an understanding with a large section of society, does not give up its values, but rather than constantly repeating this acts accordingly, seeking cooperation with similar groups, and trying to create an image that can regain the support of the masses of voters who believe in the middle class value system. It has a chance to do this because, if we look at the latest Gallup poll results, we can see that a great many people who voted for the Free Democrats have the attitudes of the middle class value system and because the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] has become part of a left-wing government coalition its voter base will in all probability start to erode sooner or later. People who voted for the SZDSZ will probably realize that they are not getting the goods they went into the shop for. They will also realize that, although they hated the MDF government, this is nevertheless the middle class party that represents the civic values that they also support. Therefore, in addition to the 600,000 people who voted for us, by the time of the next elections, we have a chance to increase our voter base by gaining the support of another 600,000 people from this disillusioned group who support middle class values. We have to appear as a tolerant and open party with a well-rounded image that very firmly supports middle class development, and this could also embrace certain unions, even the KDNP or the smallholders. [passage omitted]

Mayors, Environmentalists Differ on Danube Issue

94CH0394B Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian 4 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by "our Bucapest correspondent": "A Standpoint on the Szigetkoz"]

[Text] "The local governments in the Szigetkoz [Little Schutt] and the region's residents expect decisive action by the Horn government, in the interest of saving the Szigetkoz," states the position that the mayor of Gyor, the chairman of the Association of Local Governments in the Szigetkoz, the municipal clerk of Mosonmagyarovar, and the deputy chairman of the Gyor-Moson-Sopron County Council released yesterday, through the National Press Office.

The standpoint deems it important that the government and parliament take into consideration, and attach more

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weight to, the views of the region's local governments and experts. For, in their opinion, that had not happened in the period just ended. They emphasize that it would not be auspicious if the Danube Circle were to remain exclusively the government's "expert."

The signatories support the partial commissioning of the Dunakiliti storage reservoir in order to recharge the river system of the Szigetkoz, but solely for the purpose of alleviating the damage in the Szigetkoz branches [of the Danube]. In their opinion, this is the only solution, albeit "of a temporary nature," that could quickly and effectively alleviate the catastrophic situation that has developed in the Szigetkoz.

Goods To Be Exchanged for Ukrainian Military Parts

LD2908194994 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] The Ukrainian military leadership is willing to hand over military spare parts and armored vehicles, which would otherwise be decommissioned by Ukraine, in exchange for Hungarian products. The Ukrainian chief of staff confirmed this when he replied to a question put by Hungarian TV following his talks with Janos Deak, chief of staff of the Hungarian Army.

[Correspondent] Leaders of the Hungarian Army were looking forward to the visit of the Ukrainian chief of staff with some uncertainty. It was impossible to know whether the plans of Kiev had changed with the dismissal of the Ukrainian defense minister last week.

Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti completed his talks with the former defense minister and agreed on the delivery of military spare parts. Anatoliy Vasilievic Lopata confirmed that the plans of the Ukrainian military leadership have not changed.

The agreement reached at the last meeting of the Ukrainian and Hungarian defense ministers is realistic, said Colonel General Lopata. The two countries have plenty to share between them. Ukraine and Hungary are good neighbors, therefore, it would be unfortunate not to utilize the advantages of this relationship. Basically, Ukraine needs almost everything, thus a vast number of Hungarian products can be used in payment for the military spare parts.

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More on Controversy Over Intelligence Chief

Walesa: Zacharski Cannot Return

LD2708083994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0713 GMT 27 Aug 94

[Text] Warsaw, 27 August—Our involvement in European structures is an issue requiring joint action; if we talked about it together it would be more effective, President Lech Walesa said, leaving Warsaw this morning for festivities at Banska Bystrica marking the 50th anniversary of the Slovak Uprising.

At the president's initiative, talks of central European leaders will be held during the festivities.

"It is inadmissible that there is 20 minutes to prepare a subject, because the Sejm decides to introduce an item that was not anticipated—there cannot be such procedural anarchy", the president said, commenting on the rejection of his veto against the sugar bill by the Sejm yesterday in spite of a letter by Lech Falandysz from his chancellery to the Sejm speaker asking for this item to be dropped from the agenda.

Asked by journalists whether he would be prepared to accept the arguments by the minister of internal affairs and to accept Marian Zacharski for the post of the UOP [State Protection Office] head of intelligence, the president replied: "Zacharski cannot return", as it would hamper Poland's contacts with the West. "I understand the national pride, I understand that we control our own affairs, this is true, but we can feel good in certain company and we can also feel bad... We are a medium-sized country and we cannot afford not to understand other people, friends in particular," the president explained.

"Here there will be no other decision and even after 20 terms of office, I shall not sign the law, the president said when asked what he would do if the Sejm overturns his veto against the Penal Code amendments liberalizing the abortion regulations. The president did not specify whether he would file a complaint to the Constitutional Tribunal, if the veto was overturned, or by refusing to sign the law would he stand before the State Tribunal. "Everything in keeping with the law, but at the same time in accordance with conscience", Lech Walesa said.

Zacharski Interviewed

WS2908120094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 29 Aug 94 pp 1, 3

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Marian Zacharski by Jerzy Jachowicz and Piotr Najsztub in Warsaw on 28 August: "Exclusively for GAZETA WYBORCZA; Zacharski Speaks"]

[Text] "I have never been linked to the KGB. I will soon reveal details that will put an end to such slander," we were told yesterday by Marian Zacharski, the super-spy of the Polish People's Republic [PRL], whose nomination as head of the intelligence service has caused a storm of controversy.

Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski will today try to win the president over to Zacharski's candidacy.

Walesa, who objected to the nomination, declared on Saturday that "Zacharski cannot come back, because this would impede Poland's contacts with the West." "I understand national pride. However, we are a medium-sized country and we must understand other people, especially our friends," the president explained. He was referring to U.S. reaction to Zacharski's nomination.

It is worth recalling that the former spy was nominated on 15 August.

After it was revealed by the press, Lech Walesa protested. The U.S. State Department recalled that Zacharski was sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States and that the sentence is still in effect.

Following these reactions, Zacharski submitted his resignation; however, Minister Andrzej Milczanowski did not accept it. He gave assurances that he had not discussed the nomination with either the president or the prime minister. There is speculation as to whether the head of the Internal Affairs Ministry will submit his resignation, or he will try to reach a compromise with the president; it is very likely that he will suggest that Zacharski be deputy chief of the intelligence service. It is not known who would head the intelligence service in such a situation.

We spoke with Marian Zacharski in one of the hotels in Warsaw, in front of Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Henryk Jasik. Zacharski, who is 43 years old, is a powerfully built man with green eyes and gray hair.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Are you a suitable candidate for the head of the intelligence service?

[Zacharski] Since my superiors have submitted by candidacy, I believe that I would be able to perform my new duties. When the quarrel over my nomination broke out, I found out—Foreign Affairs Minister Milczanowski, among others, spoke about it—that it is a political post and I lack political qualifications. I am slightly surprised at this argument, because even the law on the Office of State Protection specifies that all its functionaries should be apolitical.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Minister Milczanowski emphasized your remarkable skills. Does this mean that you have an idea of what the Polish intelligence service should be like?

[Zacharski] One of the most important things in this service is enthusiasm and a strong motivation for work. This has recently diminished. I wanted to motivate my subordinates with my own example, not with money, for instance. I wanted to make it possible for them to

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achieve a few successes, and I am thinking about several concrete issues. Nothing motivates as much as a success.

Asked whether the head of the intelligence service should not be a professional politician and only his deputy should be a specialist, Zacharski replied: "I take such a possibility into consideration. Of course, then the politician-head of the intelligence service would bear the responsibility for the activities of the intelligence service and he would have to make strategic decisions; however, operational issues would be handled by his deputy.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Would you accept the function of such a deputy?

[Zacharski] Yes, I would.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] On 17 August, which was just a few days ago, you handed in your resignation. Andrzej Milczanowski stated that "it does not have to be accepted." Are you now in charge of the Polish intelligence service or not?

[Zacharski] No, I am not. In my resignation I asked that I be immediately recalled from the position and this is exactly what happened.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Are you going to remain an employee of the special services?

[Zacharski] You serve, not work, in the intelligence service. Therefore, if I am useful to the service at any post, I will stay.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Those who criticize your nomination claim that it is absurd that a spy of PRL should head the intelligence service of the third Polish Republic; some of them are even convinced that you used to work for the KGB.

[Zacharski] They mix concepts; I was not a "spy of PRL," but an officer of the PRL intelligence service. Ryszard Kuklinski, for instance, was a spy: while he worked in the Polish Army, he spied for the U.S. intelligence service. I have never been linked to the KGB. Soon I will submit details which will put an end to these slanders.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] The Americans reacted extremely sharply to your nomination.

[Zacharski] I do not think that it was the U.S. special services that attacked my promotion. All secret services in the world think pragmatically, not in terms of revenge or offense. I think that the angry reactions came from U.S. politicians.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Today the president will meet with Minister Milczanowski and everything will be clear. Are you impatiently waiting for that?

[Zacharski] I am waiting for that quietly. However, it is with other feelings that I turn on the television or open the newspaper in the morning—here my impatience is caused by fear: what will they write about me today?

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Was your candidacy discussed with the president?

[Zacharski] I did not take part in the decisionmaking process, so I do not know that.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What about the prime minister? Did you meet him on the day you presented your resignation?

[Zacharski] We did not discuss this; my visit was linked closely to an issue that was important to Poland and that I had dealt with for several days. However, I had met the prime minister on several occasions before that, and I got the impression that Waldemar Pawlak's evaluation of my work was quite good.

Zacharski Stands By Decision

LD2908201594 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1824 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Warsaw, 29 Aug—President Lech Walesa met Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski on 29 August. The minister described the situation in the police and special forces to the president. He reported that Lieutenant Colonel Zacharski stands by his decision to resign from the post of head of the State Protection Office Intelligence Directorate. In the present situation, in spite of being regarded as highly suitable for this office, the question of M. Zacharski holding the post is pointless, the president's press office reported.

In view of various speculations in certain newspapers, the president assured Minister Milczanowski of every confidence in him.

Also discussed were candidates for the post of chief police commandant, the statement says.

Commentary: Zacharski Sacrificed

WS2908132194 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 29 Aug 94 p 1

[Commentary by Stanislaw Cwik under the "One Hundred Words" rubric]

[Text] The statement by the president concerning the need to take into account our Western "friends" reasons for opposing Zacharski as intelligence head removes all further doubt. Zacharski cannot be head of the intelligence services, despite the fact that Internal Affairs Minister Milczanowski considers him to be the best qualified candidate in Poland. Zacharski must be sacrificed in the name of "friendship."

Thus, the problem of Poland's sovereignty is coming back. How much of it should we keep, and how much should we give to our "friends?" Where is the line between partnership and treating us as a "banana republic?" Who should decide the conditions of our participation in Western economic and defense structures?

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The present situation, when such issues are spontaneously decided by the president, will be difficult to maintain. For example, because he is not enjoying people's confidence, which is backed up by public opinion research. The parliament should definitely deal with this in greater detail, and definitely more often. As for important issues, referendums seem necessary. History has taught us that true friendship between nations can be born only when there are clear and generally accepted rules of the game.

New Presidential Press Spokesman Named

LD2908210194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1808 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Warsaw, 29 Aug—Polish President Lech Walesa has agreed to have Leszek Spalinski act as his press spokesman. Mieczyslaw Wachowski, minister of state at the presidential chancellery, will show the new spokesman around the office and introduce him to the press office duties on 30 August, the president's press office reported this evening.

Sejm Rejects Presidential Veto on Sugar Industry

LD2608172794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1636 GMT 26 Aug 94

[Excerpt] Warsaw, 26 Aug— At today's session the Sejm rejected the presidential veto on the sugar industry, and again passed the law on the regulation of the sugar market and on ownership transformations in the sugar industry. The law was passed with 246 deputies voting for, 63 against, and with 16 abstentions. The required two-thirds majority was 216 votes. [passage omitted]

Bujak Says Walesa Did Not Deposit Foreign Gifts

WS2608122994 Poznan WPROST in Polish 28 Aug 94 p 13-14

[Interview with Zbigniew Bujak, chairman of the Sejm Administration and Internal Affairs Commission, by Jerzy Slawomir Mac; place and date not given: "A Collective Keyboard"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mac] Do you think that politicians in Poland have clean hands?

[Bujak] When it comes to the top political circles—yes. It is fortunate that in this overall confusion, we can still trust those who are the leaders of our political scene. That does not mean, however, that there are no ambiguous situations. Everybody knows that President Walesa has in the past received many foreign awards. The Foreign Currency Law imposes an obligation on him to deposit the money with domestic banks. This is not, however, what Walesa did. I can understand that the president—as he himself has once told me—is afraid of what might happen in Poland and the resultant negative effect it could have on his money. In that situation, however, how can we hold it against others for conducting various illegal financial transactions? That does not mean, however, that the president has in fact stolen something, or that he is trying to build some form of Mafia arrangement. [passage omitted]

MSW Moves, Minister's Possible Dismissal Viewed

WS2608113794 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 26 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by Anna Kwiatkowska: "A Game Surrounding MSW; A Change of Guard?"]

[Text]*The Sejm Internal Affairs Administration Commission has invited Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski to take part in the commission's extraordinary session scheduled to take place next Tuesday. The minister is to present a report on personnel moves in the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW]. As TRYBUNA has learned unofficially, a vote of "no confidence" for the minister may be submitted during the commission's session.*

According to Zbigniew Bujak, the commission's chairman, the following two issues will be the most important ones on the agenda: One is a fact of the past (the appointment of Marian Zacharski as intelligence chief), whereas the other one is the issue of a candidate for the post of national police chief. "The situation within the Office of State Protection [UOP] results in a decline in the moral authority enjoyed by the institution, as well as a decomposition of the intelligence services," Sejm Deputy Bujak has told TRYBUNA. According to Bujak, Minister Milczanowski will not succeed in retaining Marian Zacharski as intelligence chief. What the appointment did do, on the other hand, was damage the rapport among the president, the prime minister, and the MSW chief. "Such a situation"—Zbigniew Bujak told us—"could possibly lead to the minister's dismissal." The chairman of the Sejm commission is of the view that the issue of the protracted lack of appointment of a national police chief, is also detrimental to the ministry.

There is unofficial talk in the Sejm about two possible candidates for the ministerial post: Among the names being mentioned is Mieczyslaw Wachowski, currently a minister of state in the President's Office, and also current UOP chief Gromoslaw Czempinski. Sejm Deputy Tadeusz Kowalczyk (Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms) is being mentioned as a candidate for a deputy minister.

It looks as though the current maneuvers surrounding MSW are just another element in the presidential election campaign. There has been talk for a long time now, that two factions have been clashing in MSW: A presidential faction, and an apolitical one. According to Sejm Deputy Jerzy Dziewulski (Democratic Left Alliance), one should be amazed at the fact that even though

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Minister Milczanowski took a break from his vacation to deliver a report on the Zacharski appointment, Gromoslaw Czempinski—who had signed the nomination—continues to say nothing. There is talk inside MSW that among the supporters of the decision to appoint Zacharski as intelligence chief, were Minister Milczanowski and Deputy Minister Henryk Jasik, whereas Gromoslaw Czempinski is said to have been skeptical about the candidacy.

There is no doubt that this storm surrounding MSW—another in a series—does not serve the ministry's interests well. It turns out, however, that political considerations prevail over substantive ones. The stakes in the game surrounding MSW are high. We could one day find out how high they really are.

Kolodko on London Club Agreement To Cut Debt

LD2708191494 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1730 GMT 27 Aug 94

[Text] Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko has said that the London Club will reduce Polish debts by half. Poland owes over $13 billion to several hundred private banks that belong to the London Club.

Our debts to the London Club are made up of over $8 billion of the main debt, almost $4 billion in unpaid interest and over $1 billion in commercial loans. After almost four years of negotiations it has been possible to bring about a reduction in the debts, which is beneficial for Poland.

The talks gained pace when the chairmanship of the so-called London Club was taken over by the Dresdener Bank. Of the 500 commercial banks to which Poland owes money, 495 have already approved Poland's plan to have part of the debts converted into bonds, some of which would be bought back by Poland.

[Begin Kolodko recording] Yesterday we succeeded in reaching an agreement that as many as 99 percent of our creditors will opt to buy part of the debts. That is after 14 years of abnormal financial relations with the world, in the next few days we shall sign a final agreement, so this historical accord with regard to the normalization of Poland's financial relations will take place. [end recording]

[Correspondent] After the negotiations conducted so far it was decided that a quarter of the debts would be bought by the end of October. For one dollar of the main debt we shall pay 41 cents and the rest of the debt will be turned into bonds.

The Ministry of Finance estimates that about $2 billion will be needed to buy the debts and pay off interest. Part of Poland's hard currency reserves and loans from the World Bank and the IMF will be earmarked for this purpose.

[Begin Kolodko recording] All day today we have been working on the guidelines for next year's budget. In the column showing expenditures there is an entry for 17 trillion zloty for this purpose. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The final agreement will be signed 13 September.

Results of Poll on Likely Presidential Candidates

WS2908132394 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 27-28 Aug 94 p 2

[Report by WZ: "GfK Polonia: Presidential Ratings; Who Is Suitable"]

[Text] "It is all the same to me" was the reply of one-third of all respondents to a GfK Polonia institute poll, which asked who is the most suitable person to serve as president of the Polish Republic.

Of the respondents, 16.6 percent pointed to [Democratic Left Alliance Chairman] Aleksander Kwasniewski; 8.8 percent—Lech Walesa; 4.3 percent—Waldemar Pawlak. Thirty-one percent stated that they cannot name any politician who would be worthy of this position.

GfK Polonia also asked who—in the respondents' opinion—has the greatest chance of winning the elections. Here as well, Aleksander Kwasniewski proved the most popular (29.5 percent), followed by Walesa (13.3 percent), and Pawlak (4.4 percent). Very few people thought any other politician stands a chance of achieving success.

Kwasniewski is primarily supported by entrepreneurs and inhabitants of large towns and cities. Walesa—by senior citizens, peasants, and the poorest segments of society. Pawlak is supported by inhabitants of rural areas and people with elementary educations. Women, young people, and unskilled workers were most often unable to specify any candidate.

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President Iliescu's Health Said Worsening

AU2908163694 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 27 Aug 94 p 4

[Marcela Feraru, Adrian Halpert report: "Is Ion Iliescu in the Situation of Being Unable To Exert His Presidential Prerogatives?—The Health Condition of the Head of State Has Visibly Worsened"]

[Text] On Thursday [25 August], during a conversation with a person close to the medical team that had performed the cholecystitis [inflammation of gallbladder] operation on President Ion Iliescu on 22 July, we learned that the head of the state was taken to the Elias Hospital after he had suffered an acute crisis, rather than for a routine checkup, as was announced in the official communiques released by Presidential Spokesman Traian Chebeleu. President Iliescu's routine checkups are completed by a team of physicians who usually go to the Cotroceni Palace for that purpose.

The same source revealed that immediately after the operation the evolution of the illness could not be foreseen, that being the reason for the suspicious, to say the least, news blackout that followed. Under similar circumstances in any Western democratic country, they would have issued daily communiques to inform public opinion.

At the same time, the source also confirmed the aggravation of President Ion Iliescu's health condition, now, over one month after surgery. The source informed us that complications appear in the majority of gallstone [litiaza biliara] cases in patients aged over 60, and these complications lead to inability to work. The source also confirmed the fact that the treatment to which Romania's president is currently undergoing may not be completed at home, but requires his presence at the hospital. This confirms the emergence of complications of an unknown nature, complications that are not being revealed due to the traditional secretiveness of the persons responsible for informing public opinion.

On the other hand, in another conversation with an official of a Western embassy in Bucharest, it was confirmed to us that the health condition of the head of state is bad. The representatives of Western states in Romania—diplomats and employees in charge of other things—are highly interested in this case, and they elaborate weekly reports to brief the officials in their countries.

In connection with the anger displayed by the Cotroceni Palace spokesman, we would like to point out that he could spare himself the trouble he accused us of having stirred if only he would do his duty by offering official information referring to President Ion Iliescu's health condition. Otherwise the journalists have no choice but to continue resorting to other sources of information, which might reveal less likable aspects for Romania's presidency.

PUNR 'Profiteers' in New Government Condemned

AU2908083294 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 22 Aug 94 p 1

[Bogdan Firceag article: "An Absurd Victory"]

[Text] Through the recent government reshuffle, the representatives of the Romanian extremism and mafia have registered a new victory. In fact, it is a pseudo-victory in a war without opponents directed against the basic rules of democracy, common sense, and lawfulness.

The access of the PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party] to the government has been done as usual "sneakily," through methods that had been well-practiced during the previous two reshuffles. Thus, we have reached a situation in which half of Romania's current government ministers have no parliamentary validation. From a monocolor government we came to have a color government, without the legislative forum having a say in it. This is a new flagrant violation of the constitution, carried out cynically by the representatives of a political formation that continues to prove more and more frequently that it represents only itself to the detriment of those who voted in its favor.

The PUNR's access to the government, apart from the fact that it is a violation of the constitution, certifies the victory of profiteers against the last vestiges of lawfulness that still existed in this country. The national swindles "Caritas" and "Gerald" [nation-wide money pyramid schemes], which brought millions of people to the threshold of despair, have been openly and officially supported by PUNR leaders. They defied any trace of common sense, when instead of entering prison they entered the government. Moreover, we have just learned that the minister of justice is also a PUNR member. In this situation, it would seem grotesque even to talk about "lawfulness" in Romania. Who would dare call to account Ioan Stoica ["Caritas" chief] or his acolytes "in high positions" who no longer attempt to disguise their ostentatious wealth? Through this move "at the top" Romania has officially become the homeland of rogues. In fact, birds of a feather flock together. The PUNR is an ideal ally of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], the promoter of corruption in this country. Why should the PUNR members feel ashamed, when their masters show a lack of scruples and develop obscure associations beyond all limits of decency! And we can find examples right at the top. The affairs of the Nastase-Miculescu clan [reference to houses owned by PDSR Executive President Adrian Nastase and his father-in-law Angel Miculescu] are well known to the public. The "defrauding" with the "four houses" has thus become a minor matter compared with the "father-in-law's" underground maneuvers. And we could continue endlessly with our examples.

The dramatic nature of the extremist-mafia power's offensive is even greater when we see that it not only

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destroys the elementary norms of an incipient democracy in our country, but also irreparably deteriorates Romania's image—bad as it is—abroad. The access of extremist-nationalists to government has been immediately noted by international observers with stupefaction and concern. We will be treated again with suspicion and again our foreign policy will have to be based on lies and begging, when normally we would have had a great chance to assert ourselves with dignity and regain the place that we once held among civilized nations. However, those in power are not concerned with the national interest, only with their own interest. Again we have disgraced ourselves, especially since last Thursday's [18 August] act might set a precedence. In fact, why should it be only the PUNR that joins the government? What, Mr. Corneliu Vadim Tudor [Greater Romania Party president] is more stupid? Why should he be inferior to PUNR-Caritas-Gerald? At the current pace, as we approach autumn, we have every chance to expect preparations for the 15th Congress [reference to the former Romanian Communist Party that had held a total of 14 congresses].

This is not just a macabre joke. The pugnacity and aggressiveness of those currently in power proves that they have totally given up the genuine political struggle. The PDSR team understands that it no longer has a chance to stay in power after the next elections, provided that those elections are held under normal circumstances, and they try to cling to power by force. Last week's reshuffle is probably only the beginning of the final offensive.

And something else: the PUNR's access to the government would have been impossible to accomplish without President Ion Iliescu's complicity. Although those who disseminate rumors try to plant in the public's mind the idea that the president had no knowledge of the situation, that he is increasingly lonely, that he can no longer control the "pentagonal" alliance, and that he detests corruption, however, he found the necessary power to sign the act of reshuffle. Probably the persons in charge of distributing rumors will motivate again his act by saying "he had no other choice." However, there is still a solution in order to stay "poor, but honest" as he likes to say, in order clearly to detach himself from the profiteers who have become impossible to handle. That is a solution that political leaders, who really have moral backbone, have already resorted to, namely, resignation.

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UN Confirms 'New Wave of Ethnic Cleansing'

AU2908160494 Paris AFP in English 1559 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 29 (AFP)—Some 400 Moslem inhabitants of the Bosnian town of Bijeljina have been chased from their homes by Serb militia in a new wave of ethnic cleansing in the northeast of the country, the UN said Monday [29 August].

The new group brings to some 1,100 the number of people expelled in the eighth such episode in the locality since mid-July, according to the spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Sarajevo, Peter Kessler.

Kessler said that among those expelled were elderly persons, too weak to walk, having to be carried across the front line on Sunday evening, between Serb positions at Povrsnica and the Bosnian village of Kovacica.

"The process and the pace at which it's going is extremely disturbing to the UNHCR", said Kessler.

He condemned "the systematic means used by the Serbs by which these people are collected, harassed, robbed of their possessions and their money".

In spite of undertakings by the Serbs to put an end to this practice, "there is no will to put those words into action", he said.

Tuzla Mayor Sees 'End of Ethical Mankind'

AU2908192094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Last night 450 Bosniak refugees arrived in the Kovacica region on Mt. Majevica. They had been expelled from their homes in Bijeljina by the Serb aggressor, who was thus continuing the process of ethnic cleansing.

Some 20 of them were in extremely poor condition of exhaustion, and they were taken to the Tuzla hospital, while the others have been accommodated in a temporary reception center. The price for leaving Bijeljina for Bosniaks of military age was 1,600 German marks.

The representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UNHCR, and the UN Protection Force witnessed this latest act by the aggressor, the exodus of the Bosniaks.

Concerning this latest exodus of Bosniak Muslims, Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic has sent a letter to the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNHCR, and Tadeus Mazowiecki, UN special envoy for human rights. The letter reads as follows:

This is obviously not just a criminal act of ethnic cleansing as the expelled people not only had to give up their property under pressure and leave their homes, but they were also physically abused during the deportation by the Serbian fascists. This criminal act is also not just a local problem, nor is this just the tragedy for those expelled. This act represents the destruction of the civilizational achievements of the 20th century. It marks the end of human and ethical mankind.

That is why it is high time the international community rose from its lethargy and looked into its Bosnian face. This is said in the letter by Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic.

Referendum Shows '96 Percent' Against Plan

AU3008080494 Paris AFP in English 0751 GMT 30 Aug 94

[Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Aug 30 (AFP)—At least 96 percent of Bosnian Serbs rejected the international contact group's proposed partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in this weekend's referendum, according to partial results after three-quarters of the ballots were counted Tuesday.

The national electoral commission issued the estimated result after ballots were counted from 62 of the 82 municipalities which the Bosnian Serbs have included in their self-proclaimed Serb Republic.

The commission's president, Petko Cancar, said there was a 90.86 percent turnout.

In the 62 municipalities, 785,923 people voted and 96.05 percent of them voted against the proposed peace plan with 3.39 percent voting in favour.

Complete official results are expected Tuesay evening or Wednesday and will be officially announced by the Bosnian Serb self-styled "parliament."

Izetbegovic, Kozyrev on 'Constructive' Talks

AU2908191894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Report by Senada Cumurovic on news conference by Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in Sarajevo on 29 August—recorded]

[Text] [Cumurovic] Following two hours of talks with Kozyrev, Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic briefly commented on the talks:

[Izetbegovic] Mr. Kozyrev is here as a representative of a member country of the Contact Group to seek peace for Bosnia-Herzegovina. You know that we have always taken a lot of notice of the attitude of the Russian Federation, that is, Russia. We consider it very important for the solution to this issue. We have never neglected its role in this respect. We naturally discussed the control of borders. Mr. Kozyrev discussed the same issue with Milosevic last night. We also discussed some bilateral relations, for example, the problems with gas deliveries, which is a very topical issue here, also cooperation concerning the prosecution of war criminals

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through the war crimes tribunal, and similar issues. The talks were very open and, I think, very constructive and useful.

[Cumurovic] After yesterday's interesting—as he put it—talks with Milosevic, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev expressed his gratitude for today's meeting with President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Silajdzic, and said the following about the talks:

[Kozyrev] These have been very frank and constructive talks, and we discussed a variety of issues. There are many serious problems that are easy to identify but hard to solve. We have to seek solutions and try and understand all the sides. I am trying to contribute to the peaceful solution and I hope that today's talks will give it some positive input.

The most important thing is that Milosevic clearly said yesterday that he supported the peace plan and that he will put all his political will behind a peaceful solution.

[Cumurovic] The first question put to Russian Minister Kozyrev was connected to the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. The lifting of the embargo is a very difficult issue, and we have to do everything before that in order to achieve peace, primarily to exert economic and political pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, who should accept the plan. The next question concerned the Russian reaction should the United States lift the embargo by 15 October.

[Kozyrev] The issue of the lifting of the arms embargo is specified in the Geneva agreement and I have nothing to add to it. As for the unilateral lifting of the embargo, I believe that this would be the last thing that we need in this situation. That would be a violation of international law. The same would apply, for example, to any unilateral lifting of the sanctions, as some Russian members of parliament have been advocating. That would be in direct violation of the UN Charter, and a complete violation of the world order.

[Cumurovic] After speaking to Milosevic yesterday, albeit unsuccessfully, on the deployment of observers on the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, Kozyrev—a man who, together with the policy he represents, is a strong supporter of the Serbian president—said the following to a question concerning that plan:

[Kozyrev] I do not think that the question of the observers is the key question. The main thing is how to support Milosevic in his support for the peace plan, and against those who are trying to reject it on the Serbian side.

[Cumurovic] Here is also a question concerning the map of the Contact Group. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev said that the maps could not be changed, except by agreement of the two sides. As far as the Contact Group is concerned, this offer is final.

Kozyrev Rejects 'Unilateral' Lifting of Embargo

AU2908160694 Paris AFP in English 1534 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 29 (AFP)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev firmly rejected the idea of a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo imposed on the warring factions in ex-Yugoslavia following top-level talks here Monday [29 August].

After meeting Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Haris Siladjzic, Kozyrev said: "I think the last thing we need in this situation is the unilateral breaking of international order.

"Any unilateral break of the sanctions, which has been advocated by some of our parliamentarians in Russia, will be a violation of the UN charter and total break with international order."

There have been moves in Washington recently to bring about the unilateral lifting of the embargo.

"The arms embargo is a very difficult issue, let's try to find something in between," Kozyrev continued, adding: "you have many things in between, especially political and material pressure on the Bosnian Serbs who have to come to their senses and say yes to the plan" put forward by the contact group.

"We have to do everything possible to achieve peace before taking any of these extreme measures," he went on.

The possibility of a lifting of sanctions was brought closer following this weekend's referendum, organised by the self proclaimed Bosnian Serb parliament based in Pale near Sarajevo, which asked whether Bosnian Serbs accepted the latest international peace plan for the region.

Preliminary unofficial results from the poll suggest an overwhelming 'no' vote.

The plan, drawn up in Geneva by an international contact group comprising Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, suggested giving 51 percent of disputed territory to the Croat-Moslem federation and 49 percent to the Serbs.

Serb forces currently control around 70 percent of Bosnian territory.

The plan has been accepted by Belgrade, Zagreb and Izetbegovic's mainly Moslem authorities in Sarajevo.

Referring to Pale's objection to the plan, Kozyrev appeared to offer a faint glimmer of hope to the Bosnian Serbs saying, "I think that we have to be consistent with the Geneva decision that the map is unchangeable except when all the parties that have accepted decide they want to change the map on mutual agreement."

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"It would be just unfair if the international community denies anybody the chance to correct anything," he added.

On Sunday the Russian foreign minister met Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade.

Washington had hoped that Kozyrev would convince Milosevic to accept the deployment of international observers to monitor an embargo announced at the beginning of August by the rump Yugoslavia of Serbia and Montenegro against Pale.

The observers have so far been rejected by Belgrade.

Kozyrev Monday played down the importance of their deployment.

"I don't think that monitors are the issue" he said, adding: "the issue is to support Milosevic ... against those who try to reject the peace plan on the Serbian side. The issue of monitors to my mind is of secondary importance".

The Russian minister praised both Izetbegovic and Milosevic for accepting the contact group's plan adding: "what is important is that they stick to that unambiguously... it is the cornerstone to build upon and to bring about peace".

Kozyrev's trip comes at a time when Bosnian Government troops are making territorial advances in Serb-held Bosnian territory.

Before Monday's meeting here, ITAR-TASS news agency quoted him as saying: "I am going to make clear to Alija Izetbegovic ... the need for the Moslem army to stop the military activities ... which threaten to severely hamper the prospects for a peaceful settlement in Bosnia."

Kozyrev was scheduled to head to Germany via Zagreb later Monday.

Izetbegovic on 'Balance of Power,' Federation

AU3008100794 Paris AFP in English 0945 GMT 30 Aug 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 30 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said the Moslem Bosnians were well on their way to building an army of 200,000 men and that prospects for peace with the Bosnian Serbs were not good.

His comments were published Tuesday by the daily OSLOBODJENJE after Bosnian Serbs massively rejected the international contact group's peace plan for the ex-Yugoslav republic.

Izetbegovic said: "We knew the war would last a long time and that for us to reach a situation favourable to us we would have to create an army of 200,000 men and that takes time.

"Now we are at that stage. A certain balance of power has been established, but it is not symmetrical. We are doing our best to narrow the gap in technical strength, and, to some extent we are succeeding," he said.

Izetbegovic blamed the Bosnian Serbs for the receding hopes of peace. "Unfortunately, prospects for peace at the moment are not particularly good. The blame for that lies on the Bosnian Serb side," he said.

The president said that in order to achieve "strategic change on the ground we still need arms, particularly artillery.... But, the additional weapons do not necessarily have to be connected with the lifting of the embargo. It would be the easiest way from the military point of view but it would then create a whole range of other problems."

He did not say where the weapons would come from.

He was guardedly hopeful about the future of the Croat-Moslem Federation but stressed that the Federation was more important to the Moslems than to the Croats.

"Establishing the Federation depends to a great extent or almost completely on the other partner, that is the Croats. After the first successful steps the process has come to a halt and I started wondering whether they (the Croats) really wanted the Federation.

"I say 'Croat side' as if they were an entity, but they are not. In my opinion, as far as the Federation is concerned, they are divided, seriously divided, I'm afraid," he warned, adding that "there is strong opposition to the Federation in the political and military structures of the HVO (Bosnian Croats) [Croatian Defense Council].

"I can only repeat once more that cooperation and good relations with the Croat nation and Croatia are in the strategic interests of the Moslems," Izetbegovic said.

He noted that "on the Moslem side, forces in favour of the Federation are dominant. On the Croat side, it's the opposite. But we also have to take into account the international factor, particularly the United States and Germany."

"If one takes into account this influence, one can say that the forces that are for the federation are stronger and that they will prevail eventually after some efforts," he said.

Krajisnik: Serbian Confederation 'Unacceptable'

AU2908163294 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 27-28 Aug 94 p 4

[BETA-attributed report: "Confederation Is Unacceptable"]

[Text] Jagodina—The leadership of the Srpska republic wants a unitary state of all Serbs and considers a confederation between the Srpska republic and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], even if temporary, unacceptable. This is what Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the assembly of the Srpska republic, told Jagodina

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Radio yesterday, commenting on the proposal made by the Democratic Party [DS] in the Serbian Assembly to establish a confederation between the Srpska republic and the FRY.

"The Srpska republic leadership is of the opinion that the only real solution is to create one Serbia for all of us," Krajisnik pointed out, "and that any possibility of forming new nations and new divisions should be prevented for good." Krajisnik said that "what is involved in our case is not two states, but one people who can only live in a unitary state without borders or special autonomous state entities."

True, the Srpska republic assembly chairman allowed that "Mr. Djindjic's [chairman of the DS] proposal would perhaps be acceptable for a part of the people in the Srpska republic." However, "such a variant, even if temporary, is unacceptable" for the Srpska republic leadership, he said, and "there is not a single nation in the world that is connected in a confederation."

"Why are we struggling to have all this as Serbia? It is because experience tells us that Serbs are inclined toward divisions," Krajisnik explained.

A confederal state as a transient solution would create a rift among Serbs. "These borders now provide an excuse to some people to separate and claim these territories. Perhaps some new Srpska republic leadership would want to separate themselves from that confederal Yugoslavia, invoking rights granted to them at one time," Krajisnik concluded and remarked that the Srpska republic leadership is therefore of the opinion that "one Serbia is the only right solution."

UN, Army Commanders View Relations With Croats

LD2808140394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 28 Aug 94

[Text] We learned just before the beginning of this bulletin that General Rasim Delic, General Staff commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, has received General Ridgeway, commander of the UN forces' southwest sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The talks centered on the results achieved in implementing the agreements between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croat Defense Council with special emphasis on the region of central Bosnia, as well as on future steps for consistent implementation of the agreements in the field.

Viewed in global terms, the work of the Gornji Vakuf-based political committee was assessed as successful. Gen. Delic voiced his full support for the committee's work on its present tasks and on the authorizations received by the representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. All possible isolated problems cropping up in the field stem from the frivolousness of individuals at the local level, not from the orders issued to the unit commanders, Gen. Delic stressed.

'Collaboration' of Mafia, UNPROFOR, Serbs

AU2908150394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Today's news conference of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBHSD] of Sarajevo dealt with the possibility of easing the winter hardships for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina's capital.

The party believes that the main problem lies in the collaboration among the local mafia, the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], and the aggressor's side. This endangers [words indistinct], and local gangsters, through UNPROFOR, see to it that the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor closes the blue routes and prevents the delivery of humanitarian aid. Later, through routes known only to themselves, they let only as much humanitarian aid filter through to the city as will not cause a fall in prices.

The UBHSD of Sarajevo wants the Sarajevo City Council to ask the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and Government to demand from the UN Security Council and secretary general to use all means to prevent the strangulation of the city.

Conflict Causes 'Demographic Cataclysm'

AU2908174094 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 18-25 Aug 94 pp 4-5

[H. Arifagic article: "The Demographic Cataclysm"]

[Text] The population figure for Bosnia-Herzegovina was, in late March this year, smaller by over 1.5 million, and the loss is 275,000 people. There is also the missed natural population growth, as well as a significant number of emigrant workers who left Bosnia- Herzegovina every year to work in the developed former Yugoslav republics and European countries. There are over 200,000 wounded, and about 15,000 invalids. Over 2 million people left their places of residence either as displaced persons or refugees. At any rate, this area is facing a demographic cataclysm. Prof. Ilijas Bosnjovic's study, done on the basis of the results of his research on the influence of war on the change of Bosnia-Herzegovina's population, and its two structures—according to ethnic affiliation and territorial distribution—thus deserves special attention.

A Fast Extinction

In 1990 Dr. Bosnjovic stirred up public controversy with his book *The Demographic Black Hole, the Trap of Industrial Society,* because he found that the white man of industrial society was on his way to becoming extinct. In his text titled "The Real and the Possible," published in VREME in August 1991, he pointed out that the war between the Serbs and Croats had led to a demographic

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catastrophe. Namely, peoples whose families consist of one or two children should not wage wars if they want to prevent fast extinction.

"Interethnic arguments and various everyday conflicts are an additional factor of pressure on the psyche of young persons, depriving them of any prospects. The young people, thus disturbed and insecure, renounce even the thought of entering marriage and starting a family, which will soon add even more to the decrease in the birth rate. Even if there is no shooting, but there is enough screaming and fighting, there will be fewer newborn Serbs and Croats. There will be enough trouble that it will create a mechanism to destroy the biological substance of these two peoples and gradually remove them from the historical scene," wrote Dr. Bosnjovic at the time.

Although it has always been an unrewarding job to keep up with the demographic changes in war-stricken territories, he took on the challenge, and our public should know what happened to the Muslims, who have sufferred the most in this aggression.

The Muslims Are the Most Endangered

In his latest research, Dr. Bosnjovic took as his starting point the information that 4,384,436 people lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 31 March 1992 (according to the 1991 census, there were 4,364,571), and went on to conclude that in late March this year there were 2,879,300. What was really happening with the population of Bosnia- Herzegovina and with the individual ethnic groups? In what way have mass dying, forced migration, the destruction of the birth rate, and great disturbances in the biological renewal trends manifested themselves in these areas? These events have not been recorded in a statistical or any other reliable way.

Embarking upon a complex job, the researcher used many other sources of information, discussed many important issues with groups of experts, took positions on certain problems, and formulated the research results only after thorough analyses, thus providing them with the necessary basis.

The main conclusion following the research is that the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina has relatively and absolutely disappeared during this war. This primarily relates to displaced persons (1,299,287, of which 60 percent are women, 52 percent are people between the ages of 18 and 65, while 23 percent are children between three and 14 years of age), and particularly Muslims.

Following the figure of 275,000 killed, dead, and missing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, overall and according to ethnic affiliation, Dr. Bosnjovic came to the conclusion that the Muslims make up over half of this group—139,000 or 50.5 percent—and they thus exceeded the percentage of their share in the total population in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The figures concerning the Serbs are also high—96,000 or 34.9 percent of the total population. The figures relating to the Croats are 28,000, or 10.2 percent. The percentage of the persons who were killed, who died, or are missing is the following: 7.3 percent for the Muslims, 3.7 percent for the Croats, 7.0 percent for the Serbs, and 6.3 percent for the others in the total population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On the basis of the estimate of the Ministry for Refugees and Social Policy (the registration of the refugees has not been carried out), the author used a special procedure to determine the ethnic affiliation of the refugees. There are 543,000 or 43.4 percent Muslims, 222,000 or 17.8 percent Croats, 388,000 or 31.0 percent Serbs, and 97,000 or 7.8 percent others.

"As there are a large number of Muslims who have been displaced or killed (both absolutely and by percentage), their share in the refugee figure is relatively low," explained Dr. Bosnjovic. "The Muslims moved more within Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they suffered more."

The Most People in the Federation

From March 1992 to late March this year the population of Bosnia- Herzegovina has grown by 19,860 [sentence as published]. According to ethnic affiliation, there are the most Muslims—10,903 or 54.9 percent; the share of the Croats is 3,197 or 16.1 percent, of the Serbs 4,429 or 22.3 percent, and 1,331 or 6.7 percent of the others.

Examining the Bosnia-Herzegovina territories according to the occupied areas and regions, one arrives at the conclusion that at 38.2 percent of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory the forces connected to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation prevail. This includes the territory temporarily controlled by the para-military formations of Cazinska Krajina. Therefore, the Serbs dominate on 61.8 percent of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory, which is far less than what was believed until now.

These results have been confirmed by an independently conducted survey.

On the basis of the results of previous research, the author arrived at the picture of the total Bosnia-Herzegovina population and the population according to ethnic affiliation in late Mrach this year on the integral territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among the 2,879,300 people there are 1,244,900 or 43.4 percent Muslim-Bosniak people; 511,700 or 17.8 percent Croats; 892,800 or 31 percent Serbs; and 229,900 or 7.8 percent others. The national affiliation structure is to a certain extent biased in favor of the Croats and the "others" group, and at the expense of the Muslims and Serbs. This is a logical consequence of unequal losses.

The part of the study relating to the territorial distribution of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the occupied areas also offers interesting data.

The greatest part of the remaining population in Bosnia-Herzegovina is concentrated on the area of the Federation—2,041,100 or 70.9 percent, which is much more

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than was thought up to the present. Of that figure, 82.8 percent is on the territory controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and partly cooperating with the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. A total of 14.6 percent live under the control of the HVO, and 2.6 percent of the Federation population live in Cazin Krajina (the territory under the [Fikret Abdic's] para-state control).

The World Belongs to the Old

Only 29.1 percent of the Bosnia-Herzegovina people live on the territory under the control of Karadzic's army—let us remind our readers that it is 61.8 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the internationally recognized borders. This all speaks for the kind and extent of the territorial redistribution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina population that occurred in 1992. The area exposed to ethnic cleansing has remained demographically thinned out.

Eventually, observing the ethnic coefficient that displays to what extent which people is a majority in a certain area, that is, to what extent they are mixed with the others, the study proves that the areas controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and those partly cooperating with the HVO, are the least ethnically clean, while the areas controlled by the HVO and the Serbs are almost completely single-ethnic.

Suggesting, in the end, the tasks of future demographic policies, Dr. Ilijas Bosnjovic points as the first and foremost the removing of the consequences of the war on the population of Bosnia- Herzegovina as thoroughly as possible. In this, he stated that the functions and trends of population development have been disturbed, and that it will take time and exceptional efforts to coordinate and normalize it.

Another direction of social influence on population trends relates to the specific contemporary problem of moving from higher birth rates and death rates to lower ones. The age structure and the reproduction manner thus also change. There are more old people and fewer young people. With time, the situation will arise in which there are more deaths than births. The ultimate result of such trends is extinction, a biological disappearance of the population caught in the trends.

The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina are in the process of demographic transition, says Dr. Bosnjovic. That means that they have the lowest birth rate in the Muslim world. Because of the war, the percentage of the old population in Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to increase. The demographic policies must bear this phenomenon in mind if they want to prevent premature ageing, and, ultimately, premature extinction. Especially when one takes into account the war consequences of these events.

Science will have to provide advice in this too, as well as help politics.

Serbs Launching Attacks on Doboj Defense Lines

AU3008105994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 30 Aug 94

[Text] During last night and this morning, the aggressor has incessantly attacked the theater of operations of the 7-South Operations Group, as Mirudin Aldobasic reports:

[Begin recording] Since 2200, chetniks from Ozren have been launching intensive artillery-infantry attacks, thereby endangering the Doboj defense lines, attacking them from the direction of Caruse toward Putnikovo Brdo. All these attacks have been successfully repelled.

There was no peace on other battlefields in the zone covered by the 7-South Operations Group. Chetniks also attacked the newly taken lines at Zmajevac, (Husar), and other places, but, of course, without success.

During the night, as well as the early morning hours, from the occupied towns of Doboj and Teslic, the aggressor shelled the center of Tesanj and the villages nearby, particularly Putesic, Mrkotic, Jela, and Kalosevic. [end recording]

Serbian Attacks on Brcko Region, Maglaj Reported

AU3008092394

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 30 August, within its regular seven-minute newscast, carries reports on the situation in the republic.

A studio announcer reads a report by the 1st Corps Information Service saying that "during the last night, chetniks opened sporadic infantry fire on all lines of separation around (?Sarajevo) and in some regions, they even used banned [words indistinct]. From the (Torlikova) Stijena, they fired a Praga gun on the defense lines of (Orlic) and also opened fire from a M-84 machine gun. They targeted Vrbanja Most with rifle grenades, and an enemy M-84 machine-gun fired from Nedjarici at Stupsko Brdo. A large column of military vehicles was seen in the region of (Cimanovici)."

Hamiz Deronjic reports from the Brcko region that "during last night and this morning, the Serbian aggressor intensified attacks on the free Brcko territory. During the entire last night, in longer intervals, chetniks pounded our positions ferociously, opening fire with Broving guns, antiaircraft guns, and submachine-guns." Finally, Deronjic says that "about 0700 this morning, chetniks started launching fierce artillery attacks on the free Brcko territory. The aggressor fired 122-mm and 125-mm howitzers, and 120-mm mortars at the defense lines and at civilian targets. The enemy directed the most fierce artillery fire on the central section of the Brcko defense. Fighters of the 108th Motorized Brigade responded adequately and the aggressor calmed down

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after (?0700). There have been no casualties among the ranks of the defenders or civilians."

A report by the 3d Corps Press Center read by an unidentified correspondent says that "the towns of Maglaj and (?Tesanj) were yesterday exposed to wild chetnik artillery attacks" and that "along all defense lines, our fighters spotted the aggressor forces regrouping and bringing reinforcements deeply into the temporarily occupied territory. In the evening, an aggressor's Bofors gun pounded the center of Maglaj, but fortunately there were no casualties. The fighters of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina managed to repel all chetnik attacks."

Amira Salihbasic reports that "there were no strong chetnik attacks on the Olovo battlefield yesterday, but the chetnik phalanxes are not calm [words indistinct]. Last night, the chetniks pounded our fighters' positions with mortars and guns, increasing infantry provocations throughout the entire night. According to intelligence reports, the aggressor has been concentrating his forces lately on all sections of the temporarily occupied territory."

Serbian Attacks in Gorazde Region Reported

AU3008123594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 30 Aug 94

[Report by Enes Musovic from Gorazde]

[Excerpt] The chetniks have continued attacking the Gorazde region. Villages in the region between Vitkovici and Josanica are being targeted particularly. This morning, these villages, particularly the local community of Vranici, are being exposed to fierce chetnik fire from snipers, (?M-84 machine guns), and antiaircraft machine-guns. Last night and this morning, the chetniks were active on almost all lines of separation around the completely besieged Gorazde. These attacks are most intensive in the region of Vrazalice, Vranovina, and Borovac where mortar bombs were registered as well. The chetniks acted with antiaircraft machine-guns and antiaircraft guns from (Gocina) on (Hrenovic). [passage omitted]

Serbs Attack Within Sarajevo Exclusion Zone

AU2908201594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] During the day the Chetniks carried out several heavy artillery attacks on civilian targets on the free Zvornik territory with howitzers, hill guns, and mortars of all calibers. This afternoon, they used artillery to fire at the Vitinica area and the defense positions there. The tragic result of the Chetnik attacks on this region over the last 24 hours is one 7-year-old child killed and three slightly wounded civilians. The enemy fired with small arms and antiaircraft weapons at the other defense lines, reports Enes Hasanovic from the Information Service of the 206th Chivalrous Brigade Zvornik.

This afternoon the Chetniks again fired artillery barrages at Tesanj. At the same time the fighters of the joint units of the 7th South Operative Group successfully repulsed a tank and infantry attack by the aggressor in the area around Bezimeni Vis, Crvena Jabuka, and Omerovo Guvno, reports Mirudin Aldobasic from the Information Center of the 7th South Operative Group.

Early this afternoon Chetnik artillery started to pound Gradacac. Hill guns targeted the town center, while 82-mm and 120-mm mortars shelled the defense lines of Vida and the residential areas of the commune. This was accompanied by heavy small arms fire, while the aggressor occasionally used antiaircraft guns and machine guns, and antitank weapons on the western part of the front, according to a report from the Information Center of the 107th Chivalrous Motorized Brigade Gradacac.

As for the Bihac Commune, the attacks by Martic's forces and Abdic's rebels were accompanied by provocative fire by Karadzic's Chetniks on the Bihac front, and they intensified their artillery attacks on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau and the outskirts of Cazin. They fired a dozen shells at Ostrozac and continued to demolish civilian targets on the left bank of the Una River on the free Bosanska Krupa territory. During the day new regrouping of the enemy forces was reported, particularly on the Krupa and Bihac parts of the front, reports Mirza Sadikovic.

Since this morning a major offensive by the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor has been under way on the Mt. Cemer front. The fiercest attacks by enemy artillery and infantry has been directed at Jasen, Korito, and Visnjica. In these attacks the aggressor has deployed all available artillery pieces on the surrounding hills and infamous strongholds, which are within the 20-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo, in Medojevici, Ljubina, Srednje, and Cevljanovici. There are 30 howitzers of various calibers there, five batteries of 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, several hill guns, Bofors guns, self-propelled antiaircraft guns, eight tanks, and antiaircraft machine guns and guns. Artillery and infantry attacks have been coming in waves against the defensive positions, but our fighters have been repulsing them successfully. The importance that is attached to this offensive is confirmed by the fact that the aggressor's units from the 1st Krajina corps are participating in the offensive, as are the Romanija, Ilijas, and Ilidza brigades, special units of the ministry of internal affairs of the so-called Srpska republic, units from the Herzegovina corps, and self-organized Chetnik gangs from Ilijas, Vogosca, and from parts of the self-styled Yugoslavia.

Two of our fellow citizens have been wounded in Sarajevo. Fehim Karisik, an employee of the Bosna construction company, was wounded by shrapnel at the Moscanica site, while another person was wounded by M-84 machine gun fire in the area of Sjenicka Kosa. The aggressor's snipers have again been violating the anti-sniper agreement in Sarajevo. The Chetniks have kept

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Sedrenik under heavy sniper fire from Spicasta Stijena and have been using dumdum bullets. They have been firing at the Orlic defense lines from Cavrkova Stijena. Intensified small arms fire and hand grenades have also marked the aggressor's activities around Sarajevo. The Chetniks from Pitine Stijene have been firing antiaircraft machine guns at the defense lines in Borija and Kozja Cuprija, reports the Information Service of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps.

Serbs Cut Off Gas Supplies to Sarajevo

AU2908201194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Sarajevo citizens are without gas. We have received the following statement from Sarajevogas:

On 27 August the [Serbian] aggressor cut off the gas supplies for Sarajevo. The reasons for cutting off the gas supplies to the city and the possible duration of this are still not known to us. We are awaiting official information from the UN Protection Forces.

UN Protests Serb Attack on Workers

AU3008124694 Paris AFP in English 1217 GMT 30 Aug 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 30 (AFP)—Soldiers from Bosnian Government Army positions shelled workers repairing a Sarajevo water pump under UN supervision, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) complained Tuesday in a sign of growing tensions with the Bosnian authorities.

One of the 10 workers at the pump in Vasin Han, to the east of the Bosnian capital, was injured by the RBM 57 rocket fired Monday from a Bosnian position less than 300 metres (yards) away, UNPROFOR Spokesman Eric Chaperon said.

He said the team, protected by four UN soldiers, was repairing water pumps to help improve delivery of clean water to the nearly 380,000 people living in the besieged city, which has been badly damaged by two years of Serb shelling.

A letter of protest has been sent to the mainly Moslem Bosnian authorities, added UNPROFOR spokesman for Sarajevo, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Labarsouque.

"There is a clear intention on the part of the Bosnians to preserve the Sarajevan people's status as victims," commented one civilian UNPROFOR official who wished to remain anonymous.

UN experts say there is currently enough pumping capacity to supply the whole Moslem-held city but in some areas, especially the old town and frontline, there are constant cuts in the supply.

They accuse the authorities of giving better supplies to "those who work for the government's benefit," to the detriment of the rest of the population, but cannot say if this comes from local pressure groups or top government levels.

Bosnian Serb forces have also been blocking gas supplies to the city for the last four days, but UNPROFOR spokesman Major Dacre Holloway said it was only a "local problem" which UNPROFOR civilian coordinator Viktor Andreyev was trying to resolve.

An official in the Serb-held area of Butila ordered the gas supply to be cut before going to the Serb stronghold of Pale at the weekend to vote on the peace plan referendum and had still not returned by Tuesday.

Muslims Use 'Poisonous Gases' in Attacks

LD2908135694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1306 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Excerpt] Doboj, 29 Aug (TANJUG)—Members of the Muslim army are still using banned chemical combat substances—chlorine-based poisonous gases—in their attacks on Serb positions and residential areas on the Ozren-Vozuca front, the information service of the Srpska republic army's First Krajina Corps announced today. A statement specifies that the Muslims used chlorine-charged 82-mm mortar shells.

The same source says that a particularly fierce attack with poisonous gas occurred several days ago when Serb fighters requested urgent medical assistance. They suffered the symptoms of poisoning, general exhaustion, choking, headache, and some even lost consciousness. [passage omitted]

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Tudjman, Kozyrev Discuss UNPA, Sanctions

LD2908185894 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev yesterday embarked on yet another diplomatic and negotiating mission. He was received late this afternoon by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. Jozo Curic has a report on the talks:

[Curic] The Russian minister said, among other things: Russia sees the resolution of the UNPA [UN Protected Areas] in an integral Croatian state and within its internationally recognized borders; the Knin Serbs should be persuaded to negotiate with the Croatian Government.

Croatian President Tudjman received Andrey Kozyrev, Russian foreign minister and President Yeltsin's special envoy for resolving the crisis in Croatia and Bosnia, in Zagreb today. The talks ended some 20 minutes ago and were held in a constructive and agreeable atmosphere. Apart from the contact group's peace plan, the two men also discussed the overall peaceful resolution of the Croatian problem. The tete-a-tete talks went on for more than an hour and a half.

According to well-informed diplomatic sources, Croatia told Moscow that the crisis could only be resolved if the issue of the UNPA in Croatia was being addressed simultaneously.

Kozyrev told Croatian television that the talks also revolved around ways to persuade the local Serbs to negotiate with the Croatian Government. Kozyrev said that Russia reiterates its view that the resolution of the Croatian problem could only be achieved within an integral Croatia.

Diplomatic sources say that Russia wishes to uphold the entire peace process and incite the forces of peace against the forces of war. Moscow, therefore, approves of the pressure brought to bear on Karadzic but wishes to step up this pressure by lifting certain sanctions against Milosevic. The sanctions against Serbia, in his view, are linked to the pressure on Karadzic and the resolution of the Bosnian issue. This is the message Kozyrev is carrying to Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Belgrade.

Certain foreign diplomatic sources in Zagreb are not discounting the possibility that Kozyrev might have presented to President Tudjman some of Milosevic's positions regarding the normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations.

Kozyrev was welcomed at Pleso airport by Foreign Minister Mate Granic. They had a brief exchange of opinions on the peace process, especially the UN General Assembly session in New York, and on the UN Security Council session devoted to UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate.

The international community is in a hurry to end the war. Diplomats are engaged in a flurry of activity. The most important thing for Croatia, however, is to link the sanctions against Serbia to the resolution of the UNPA issue.

Kozyrev Interviewed After Talks With Tudjman

LD2908184494 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] Talks in Zagreb between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev have just ended. This is what Minister Kozyrev told our reporter Jozo Curic:

[Begin recording] [Curic, in English, with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] Mr. Foreign Minister, may I ask you a question for Croatian TV? Are the sanctions against Serbia linked to the resolution of the problem in Croatia?

[Kozyrev, in English, with superimposed Serbo-Croarian translation] Our views are somewhat different. We believe the issue of sanctions should be linked with Bosnia, as it was stated in the resolution which imposed the sanctions. However, we are ready to discuss the issue of UN-protected areas at the UN Security Council and see how it could be dealt with in a proper way.

[Curic] Your short comment on the talks with President Tudjman?

[Kozyrev] As usual the talks were very thorough, frank, and businesslike. It is always a great pleasure for me to meet President Tudjman, who has a strategic view of the situation. The problem is really a huge one. I hope we can continue helping the process between Zagreb and Knin. I would like to see the process speeded up, roads opened, and other economic issues resolved as a second phase of the peace process. This was an important part of the talks.

We also discussed ways to help resolve problems in Bosnia, on the basis of the Contact Group's plan.

[Curic] Mr. Foreign Minister, what can we expect in the near future here in Croatia as regards the negotiations with local Serbs in the UN-protected areas?

[Kozyrev] I hope some progress will be made. As I said, we are trying to influence the Serbs and the authorities in Zagreb to try to find a compromise. Of course, on the basis of the territorial integrity of Croatia, provided that their specific interests are met in a proper way.

[Curic] Can we expect any pressure on Mr. Martic and his group?

[Kozyrev] I would rather avoid this terminology? We are trying to encourage Mr. Martic and others to negotiate and to open the roads as soon as possible and resolve other issues. [end recording]

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U.S. Readies Post-Embargo Weapons Plan

AU2608195594 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Aug 94 p 5

[Article by Fran Visnar: "Ukraine Offers MiG's, the United States Offers 'Terminators'"]

[Text] How and with what weapons does the United States intend to arm Bosnia-Herzegovina if it unilaterally lifts the arms embargo?

Long ago, U.S. military experts prepared a detailed lists of weapons and ammunition to be delivered to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and worked out programs for the rapid training of soldiers. Although those plans are still secret, something always leaks out providing the United States with yet another means of psychological and political pressure on the Serbs.

The first stage of arming the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will probably not include light and medium antiaircraft weapons, for the Serb air force is grounded anyway. The emphasis is placed on the delivery of large amounts of 12.7-mm heavy machine guns, which have a longer range and a stronger impact action than the usual light infantry arms. They are mostly used against combat vehicles, helicopters, and fighter airplanes, although troops do not hesitate to use this powerful weapon against infantry targets. The first shipment of weapons may also include the latest model of U.S.-made 15-mm heavy machine guns to be tested in combat.

In addition to heavy machine guns, the United States is also offering the M-19 40-mm automatic grenade launcher, whose basic ground version (weighing 33 kg) has its own stand and can be mounted on any kind of vehicle. One version of the weapon is mounted on helicopters making the M-19 weigh 63kg, giving it the shape of dual launchers. The automatic launcher will be extremely useful to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army for its firing range is 1.5 to 2 km, and the rate of fire between 325 to 375 shells per minute, each shell having a muzzle velocity of 240 meters per second. The latest version, the Type 3 M-19, penetrates armors of light armored vehicles and transporters easily.

Experience From Vietnam

The third entry on the list is modern antitank weapons, and the planned priority shipment for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army includes the TOW mobile system, i.e. the improved versions TOW 2, TOW 2A and B, and TOW 3, with ranges of 500 to 3,750 meters. In the Gulf war of 1991, the TOW 2B and TOW 3 were described as "reliable terminators of every kind of Iraqi tank and armored vehicle."

The United States is offering 81-mm mortars (common in the West) launching 4.5 to 7 kg heavy mortar shells at a distance of 3 km to a maximum of 4.7 km, which, handled by an experienced crew, can reach a rate of fire of 30 mortar shells per minute. Using M 29 mortars, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army would still be able to maneuver quickly, its fire would be precise, and it could reach targets behind obstacles. The M 29 can be mounted on armored transporters, but it can also launch mortar shells with "intelligent" infrared warheads with heat-seeking devices and destroy the enemy's vehicles and tanks.

The last item on the list is light artillery, i.e. the 105-mm howitzers used by the U.S. marines. The classic M 101 A1 and M 102 howitzers have a range of 11.5 km. In the Vietnam war, such howitzers were the most efficient U.S. weapon against the Vietcong. They are very precise and very durable weapons with a long-term barrel efficiency (the M 101 and M 102 endure several thousand shells at a time). It would be an ideal weapon for the mountainous areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina for, unlike cannons, it has a greater elevation and can reach targets behind obstacles. M 101 and M 102 howitzer batteries would be used to support Bosnia-Herzegovina Army infantry, but also to block the Serb corridor near Brcko. They would also fire special reactive rounds or rounds containing antipersonnel grenades.

It is interesting that, apart from the United States, whose special operations reserves can equip an army of 150,000 men in a short period of time, Ukraine can do almost as much. In Kiev, the Russians left 4,100 tanks, 5,000 armored transporters, more than 4,000 artillery weapons, as many as 1,100 fighter airplanes, and 330 assault helicopters. In addition to the above-mentioned weapons, there are also 1,400 tanks (including T-72 and T-80), 440 fighter airplanes (MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, and MiG-29), and 223 Mi-24 assault armored helicopters in Ukraine's commercial reserves, waiting to be sold.

NATO Is Nervous

Ukraine is very pragmatic regarding this and has a refined sense of business: It also offers the services of its experienced military instructors, missile experts for modern anti-air defense systems, crews for surface-to-surface missiles, helicopter pilots and operators, basic training or additional training of pilots for supersonic aircraft, etc. This "Ukrainian connection" captures attention in NATO circles. It is, therefore, not surprising that NATO ships exercise more caution in the Adriatic. The Croatian ship Sveti Duje, the property of the "Dalmacija Kvarner" company, suffered the results of their caution. However, the NATO inspectors did not find any SAM-10, SAM-11, or SAM-12 ground-to-air missiles of Ukrainian origin—that can not only down airplanes, but also take out guided missiles and surface-to-surface missiles—but only a harmless cargo of industrial antihail rockets that Croatia needs to protect its harvest from summer hailstorms. The delivery of weapons that a country needs to survive is not just a "back and forth" operation, as it is written on the hull of the Croatian ship. [sentence as published]

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Tudjman Interviewed on Political Developments

LD2708223394 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1818 GMT 27 Aug 94

[Interview with President Franjo Tudjman by correspondent Jozo Curic; place not given, on 26 August—recorded]

[Text] [Curic] Croatia is entering an important stage in which it will decide on the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] mandate. What can you accept at this moment in connection with the mandate?

[Tudjman] It is easy to see that this problem is not only our Croatian problem but also a problem of the international community, of the European Union [EU] and of the United Nations. It is a problem for the main international factors. The problem of Croatia's occupied areas is linked with the crisis in the entire former Yugoslavia, i.e., with the war and crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia would be in a much better position if these links did not exist. We will have to coordinate our policy and our decisons with international factors. Of course, in doing this we will resolutely defend Croatian national and state interests. I am pleased to say that full accord exists between us and the most important international factors in this respect.

There can be no discusion about transformation of the current situation into some kind of a permanent situation, like in Cyprus. Therefore, in the present situation we have demanded and obtained agreement to the effect that the process of resolving the problem of UN protected areas has to begin. It has to begin peacefully with international aid. We have already made it clear that if this cannot be done with international cooperation, Croatia will be forced to use all other means as all sovereign, internationally recognized states would do.

[Curic] If I understood Minister Kinkel correctly, he has called on refugees once again to be patient, in other words to make sacrifices. What can the EU promise Croatia in return? Would it be clear support?

[Tudjman] Well, both the EU, the United States, and UN representatives are talking about their efforts being directed toward starting reintegration in a peaceful way. This is their promise but, of course, as I have said, this is linked to the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, as you know, the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is so complex that it has even caused a split in overall Serb policy. And this is what indicates that things have gone so far that a solution must nevertheless be found in one way or another.

[Curic] In fact, the whole time Croatia has wanted to resolve the problem of the UN protected areas by peaceful means. Mr. President, what steps can you envisage here? Can you tell us what Mr. Ahrens is preparing in concrete terms.

[Tudjman] Well, nothing. Mr. Ahrens is one of the most active and important actors, if I may put it this way, in the Contact Group and the Conference on Former Yugoslavia, truly trying to find some solution in terms of peaceful reintegration. So he is constantly on the road between the sides in order to bring about not only talks, real talks, but also real agreements on beginning implementation of the whole plan.

[Curic] Mr. President, this summer in Croatia we could hear statements, even by foreign officials, about an integral Croatia supported by their governments. However, according to their ideas, this Croatia would consist of some kind of federation which would even grant the right to self-determination to local Serbs. Some Croatian politicians have also repeated this. Can you give us your comments on this?

[Tudjman] I am, of course, well informed about everything that is being discussed and proposed by official circles in Europe and the world. I have to say this resolutely—I have not heard a kind of proposal that you mentioned from any diplomatic representatives or statesmen. Nobody ever mentioned a federation; confederation was mentioned by some Serb scribblers. The problem of occupied areas in Croatia can be solved by returning them to Croatia's constitutional and legal system. Serbs, as an ethnic community, would be granted civil and ethnic rights while local Serbs would be granted autonomy in the two provinces in which they were a majority before the war, as provided for by our constitutional law. I must also mention that we are prepared, in accordance with the contitutional law, to establish a human rights court, including EU representatives. This would show that Croatia is prepared to offer guarantees to the Serbs in accordance with the constitution and our proposal for a political solution. They will have to accept this.

[Curic] This summer we may also hear opinions to the effect that the Croatian army was weak and not strong enough. Is this the real reason why Croatia is insisting on a peaceful solution?

[Tudjman] Where did that come from: from Knin or from Banja Luka? The Croatian Army resisted the Serb aggression when that Serb aggression had the support of the entire force of the Yugo-communist army, one of the strongest in Europe. That Yugo-communist army is gone while Croatia, which was able to resist during that period, now has its armed forces. We have ground forces today, we have our air force, our navy. We have our army which is capable of restoring the occupied areas with weapons if needed, it can take control of Croatian borders. However, we have to take into account the circumstances I mentioned—the demand of the international community and Europe that we should opt for a political solution, that we should not provoke any tensions. As I said before, this issue is linked with Bosnia and having in mind that many international interests are involved in Bosnia not only can 1914 be repeated in Bosnia when World War I erupted but, and many forget this, a conflict of civilizations could take place if the

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world does not curb the clashes there. That is why we, with our Croatian Army, have to show restraint and explain to all our citizens, not only the Croat nation, that we have to be patient in order to contribute with our policy to the efforts of the democratic forces, in Europe and the world, to resolve the conflict without an escalation of fighting in order to create preconditions for establishing the new international order in the territory of former Yugoslavia, in the always troubled Balkans and in southeastern Europe to which Croatia belongs as a Mediterranean and central European state.

[Curic] The situation is very interesting, Mr. President. On one side Croatia has the support of the main world powers. On the other side patience and sacrifices are expected from it. The refugees have demonstrated a high degree of patriotism despite their difficult position. Do you think that Belgrade's recognition of Croatian borders can take place in the near future and can it lead to the resolution of the crisis?

[Tudjman] You pointed out this problem well in your question. Until a few years ago the world did not want an independent and sovereign Croatia because it wanted to preserve the old international order. Today, Croatia has friends and allies. Not only has it been recognized but it has friends and allies among the most important international powers, from the United States as the greatest world power to the Vatican as the international factor which has the largest moral authority and influence. We also have friendly relations with most member states of the EU, particularly with Germany as Mr. Kinkel's visit illustrated. We have excellent relations with Turkey and with Islamic states, with faraway China which is a world superpower. We have established very good relations with Israel in all areas—economic, cultural, sport areas—and we will establish full diplomatic relations with them. Therefore, Croatia, which has an excellent international position, is being asked to cooperate with the international community.

We have achieved such a position because we knew how to coordinate our national and state policy with trends in the modern world. We must not jeopardize this with any ill-thought moves. This Croatia which has gained friends in the world is needed by the world, by Europe, by America as a factor of the new international order. I am well aware of the difficulties facing every refugee. I was the one who told our refugees more than a year ago, perhaps two years ago, that they must also have an active role in putting forward demands—not only integrating themselves in the entire social, political, and economic life of Croatia but also playing an active role in resolving their problem.

On the other hand, when they began the operation in which they controlled UNPROFOR's movements, I told them that their acts were justified, that their anger was easy to understand. However, I also told them that they cannot become an obstacle to the implementation of Croatian and world policy which is indeed seeking a solution for the armed conflict in Bosnia. It would be easy to solve the problem if only occupied areas in Croatia were involved.

I will reply to your question directly. I think that the key to the resolution of Croatia's occupied areas is in Belgrade.

And what has just happened now with official Belgrade policy, formally, and not only formally but in reality, having witnessed clashes between Milosevic and Karadzic—this is of great importance and Belgrade will have to recognize Croatia within its internationally recognized borders and this will, of course, have a favorable effect on the resolution of the occupied areas in Croatia.

Even before this, Belgrade, as your know, signed an agreement on normalization, when we set up our representative offices—the Croatian Bureau in Belgrade and the Yugoslav-Serb Bureau in Zagreb—Belgrade came out officially in favor of gradual normalization as regards the opening of roads, water pipelines, oil pipelines, electricity supply lines, etc, in other words, in favor of a peaceful solution.

Unfortunately, in Belgrade there were some who opposed this policy—in Serbia itself. Obviously there was insufficient support in Knin for this policy, and in particular in Knin decisions were made with Karadzic and the policy of the Bosnian Serbs in mind. However, it seems that this problem will be resolved. There is the link with the problem of Bosnia and the fact that because of international circumstances, Belgrade will be left with no option other than to recognize Croatia.

[Curic] I have the impression, Mr. President, that UNPROFOR is in some way artifically maintaining the economy of the self-styled powerbrokers in the UN protected areas. On the other hand, Mikelic's government has a program of reintegration with Serbs in Bosnia, with Serbia, and so on. What will your government do if the refugees again block the UN protected areas on 15 September?

[Tudjman] I believe, above all, in the maturity of the political and national consciousness of our refugees. It is precisely people from these areas who have so far shown—both in the defense of these areas in the face of aggression, and later—the highest level of national and political maturity. When we explain to them that we will make joint efforts involving the whole Croatian people and with the help of state policy as we have conducted it hitherto, I believe that we will bring about the liberation of all Croatian areas, that we will bring about the refugees' return to these areas and that in this connection it is not important whether this will be one or two or several months sooner or later.

What is important is that we do not bring Croatia into the situation which our opponents want to see us in. They want to see Croatia, by its actions, provoke the international community into imposing sanctions. So I

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believe that our refugees will understand that they must harmonize their actions with those of Croatian state policy. There cannot be two state policies and the refugees cannot act as if they are another set of authorities in Croatia.

Therefore, on the one hand I expect the resolution of the problem to begin, the problem of UNPROFOR's implementation of the UN Security Council's resolutions. On the other hand, I expect our public to understand that everything we have achieved was through our resolute policy of establishing a democratic and sovereign Croatia and its coordination with major international powers and that we cannot bring this into question.

Let me say something: It is true that I and every other Croatian, our public, can be dissatisfied with UNPROFOR. However, we must be aware that UNPROFOR did not have a mandate, authority, and means to use force in the implementation of the Vance plan. Bearing in mind that the Serb side and the Croatian side agreed to the cessation of war in Croatia, UNPROFOR's task was to prevent further clashes between the Serb aggressor—the Serb rebels—and the Croat authorities so that the problems could be solved in a political way. UNPROFOR's task was also, by its presence, to make normal life possible in the occupied areas. This led to its tasks being distorted and our dissatisfaction because UNPROFOR did not carry out its task. However, the Serb rebels in Croatia bear most of the responsibility for this as well as Belgrade, which has been consolidating its occupation and refusing a political solution—the integration of the areas into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia.

Apart from this one should not forget that at the beginning UNPROFOR carried out important tasks which led to the ending of the war Croatia. Had the war not been brought to an end, you would have asked: why did we agree to this? We agreed to end the war in Croatia because had the war in Croatia continued we would have suffered destruction in Zagreb and other Croatian towns, while at the same time we would not have conducted a resolute defense against Serb aggression, and it would have been difficult to eject the Yugo-communist army from the areas of Dubrovnik and Prevlaka by diplomatic action.

So there have been and continue to be positive elements to the UNPROFOR presence in Croatia but, of course, the situation as it is, caused by the attitude of the Serb rebels and the attitude of Belgrade, can no longer be tolerated. A different situation came about because Croatia gained in strength as did its armed forces. Croatia has a firm international position, it has friends and allies, while Serbia has got itself into an absolutely unenviable position which is even characterized by disintegration in Serb ranks.

So conditions are far more favorable for a real start to be made to the resolution of the UN protected areas by peaceful means. But if we cannot do this by peaceful means, then Croatia will, in these new conditions, be drawn into a position in which it will have to use all means in order to recover these areas.

[Curic] I referred to Mikelic's government—and we are still on this subject. Is the next step negotiations with the local Serbs? This was practically called for yesterday by Minister Kinkel when he said there should be talks on the economy and on roads. And what is Croatia offering to the Serbs in the occupied areas, and to the people?

[Tudjman] We support implementation of the Vance plan, implementation of the resolutions. We will demand control of borders so as to sever the links between the Serbian authorities and those who do not accept a political solution. We also want the gradual reopening of roads, railways, water pipelines, oil pipelines, and so forth. We want conditions to be created—something the world is demanding—so that Croatia for its part can show political and other readiness to guarantee human and ethnic rights to the Serb population of Croatia. So, in this respect we are prepared to begin such talks and negotiations on beginning implementation of the UN Security Council's resolutions. This will depend on the Serb willingness to accept the beginning of this process under international pressure, if I can call it that. Our response to the further extension of UNPROFOR's mandate will in turn depend on this. The mandate cannot stay in its present form and we will link it with the problem of resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Curic] Finally, Mr. President, may I ask you a private question. Why didn't you take an annual holiday this year?

[Tudjman] Well, I had a holiday here. I was here because some construction work is taking place in the presidential palace. I spent my holiday here but I also carried out my regular duties. Almost every day I received official visits and carried out state duties. As you know, I received a number of statesmen here—the Turkish president, the former Italian president, and one of the most respected senators and Italian politicians, Mr. Cossiga, the Hungarian president, the Slovak president, and so forth. Every day I had a number of meetings with UN representatives, Croatia's ambassadors to the most important states in Europe and the world, and also with foreign ambassadors to Croatia. I met scientists, artists, and I attended a military maneuver and the Split and Dubrovnik festivals. All in all it was a very interesting period.

[Curic] Mr. President, thank you for this interview.

[Tudjman] Thank you for your effort. I think it is very important for our public to be objectively informed and to understand the great successes we have achieved, acknowledged by all relevant factors. As you know, I recently received President Clinton's special envoy, Mr. Redman, who is going to take up a new post, a very important post where he will maintain links with our area and with President Clinton's new envoy. You heard

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Herr Kinkel's statements yesterday and so our public must be informed about our international position and about the fact that Croatia's chances of resolving the issue of the areas are better, not worse. In this sense we should have no doubts, we should be satisfied with our achievements and continue to build Croatia into an international factor which will be respected and needed. Croatia is needed by the world.

This is what our people must understand—that today important international players are no longer interested in not allowing Croatia's survival or the establishment of an independent Croatia, or its survival [as heard] but, on the contrary, our people must understand that the world needs this democratic and sovereign Croatia and that there should be no fear whatsoever that we might discuss the abandonment of Croatian territory or the fragmentation of Croatia or the federalization of Croatia, and so on.

[Curic] Thank you.

[Tudjman] My pleasure.

RSK Caring for Refugees From Northern Bosnia

LD2708130794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1240 GMT 27 Aug 94

[Text] Belgrade, Aug. 27 (TANJUG)—Authorities of the republic of Serb Krajina alone care for tens of thousands of Muslims who have fled northwestern Bosnia before Bosnian Muslim government forces.

Croatia, which signed a confederation agreement with the Bosnian Muslim-Croat federation in March, does its best to send the refugees back to their homes.

International humanitarian organizations have given refugees a negligible quantity of food, blankets and clothing in the very beginning and then stopped the deliveries because, according to Croatian media, the roads were jammed by refugees.

Estimates made in the republic of Serb Krajina showed that more than 60,000 refugees arrived in its territory by Friday, while about 20,000 others were wandering in the mountains.

The republic of Serb Krajina was established in 1991 after Croatia seceded from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Croatia has most strongly demanded that the refugees return to Bosnia and has placed strong police and army forces to prevent them from crossing into its territory.

The refugees, who refuse all contacts with Croatian officials whom they do not trust, were assured from Zagreb by radio that they might safely return to their homes and that they would be pardoned.

Those who believed went back home but returned. They said their houses had been plundered and destroyed, and the villages of Jahovica, Marijanovac and Polja were burned down.

Velika Kladusa was the headquarters of Muslim leader Fikret Abdic, whose supporters in September 1993 proclaimed the autonomous province of west Bosnia in northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The province was proclaimed in opposition to the policy of Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic who favored the continuation of war.

After this, Abdic signed separate peace agreements with the Bosnian Serbs and Croats.

The exodus of west Bosnia refugees began on August 21, when, after months of fighting, Izetbegovic's forces captured Velika Kladusa.

Article Views Stability, Convertibility of Kuna

AU2708170794 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 19 Aug 94 p 9

[Article by Vesna Antonic: "'There Will Be No Devaluation,' the President of the National Bank of Croatia Claims"]

[Text] At its recent session, the Croatian Government pointed out that, by the end of August, Croatia's currency reserves would exceed $2 billion. In corroboration of that, it provided information that currency reserves marked an increase of $30 million in just eight days. That means that Prime Minister Valentic's prognosis made during his visit to the NBH [National Bank of Croatia] at the beginning of August, when he announced that currency reserves are supposed to reach $2.5 billion by the end of the year, are coming true. It also guarantees the stability of the kuna for the time being.

A Message to the Doubters

The level of currency reserves achieved is also the best reply to all those who had doubts about Valentic's anti-inflationary and stabilization program. Or, to put things simply, the level of the accumulated currency reserves is the result of the overall economic policy. Let us remember what the prime minister said when the currency reserves exceeded $1 billion: He emphasized that those results were a crossroads in Croatian politics and that we would either become a part of the real European market or return to inflation. He also said that the government would not yield to any pressure or allow inflation.

It all started from scratch. Toward the end of 1992, when the war was raging, Croatia was still not an internationally recognized country, it did not have its own currency, it was not a member of any international financial institution, and the Croatian central bank did not have a cent of currency reserves. The NBH made its first deposit abroad—$2 million—in the middle of February,

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1992. Toward the end of that year, the currency reserves of the NBH reached $166.8 million. A year later, they amounted to $612.4 million, which means that, in 12 months, the currency reserves increased by $445.6 million.

There Is Pressure, But...

Data for the first seven months of 1994 show the same initial trend. So, for example, in January this year, the central bank had $620.8 million, in July $976.7 million, and on 1 August the currency reserves exceeded $1 billion. More precisely, the NBH currency reserves, together with reserves in the accounts of commercial banks, amounted to $1.85 billion on 1 August. According to NBH estimates, this month could see twice the July level of foreign currency purchased. Furthermore, one must point out that, in the first five months of the year, the currency reserves were increasing at a rate of $50 million a month, reaching $70.5 million in June and as much as $110.6 million in July.

However, at the same time, rumor has it that such a rate of increase of the currency reserves is bound to lead to a devaluation of the kuna. Banking circles claim those rumors are completely unfounded. NBH President Pero Jurkovic confirmed this by saying that although a rapid increase of currency reserves could also have negative connotations, the kuna would not be devalued. "There is a some pressure on the kuna, but we manage to neutralize it by withdrawing money," the NBH president emphasized.

Convertibility

We should also remember that, in the past two months, the kuna became fully convertible, and according to estimates of the central bank, it is also convertible in current international transactions, both for Croatian citizens and foreign legal and individual persons.

During talks with the IMF, the currency reserves were one of the most important factors for obtaining the first loan from the IMF, which paves the way for loans from other international financial institutions.

The current amount of Croatia's currency reserves ensures external liquidity and the stability of the local currency, which also establishes credibility for Croatia in the world. However, the present accumulation of currency reserves is still not enough to guarantee bright prospects for the Croatian economy and a rosy future for Croatian citizens.

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Federal

Kozyrev in Belgrade for Talks With Milosevic

AU2808172094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 Aug 94

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev this evening arrived in Belgrade where he will meet Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Foreign Products Sold Despite Embargo

94BA0378A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Jul 94 p 13

[Article by Snezana Bogdanovic: "Sanctions Have Not Eliminated Goods of Foreign Companies From Yugoslavia: Blockade With Taste of Coca-Cola"]

[Text] *Jugoslavija-Komerc has no business contacts with Sony, but the Japanese know that their televisions are being sold in Belgrade; how the Belgrade branch of Honeywell operates.*

Ice-cold Coca-Cola is sipped in restaurants and McDonalds hamburgers are nibbled in pleasant garden restaurants. People still pay with their Visa cards and Honeywell computers run flawlessly. To say nothing of the television sets that we buy that are not from Nis.

When someone—a random passerby, perhaps a foreigner—notices such a large quantity of foreign goods in a country under sanctions, he will probably be confused. Or he will wonder whether the West is simply imitating an embargo, practicing strictness most frequently in the media while on the other hand accepting royalties from Yugoslav branches. Or perhaps here, once again, things have taken their own course, with disregard for the West and no payments to international corporations, at least not for the use of their names, brand names, copyrights, trademarks, or packaging?

Surrounded by Sonies

"We are not cooperating with the Japanese. As long as the sanctions are in place, we do not know each other, but this is actually a way to maintain our long-standing partners for future days. Sony is a big company, and it would not be worthwhile for it to have headaches over such a small market as Yugoslavia," says Nikola Petrovic, the director of the branch offices division of Jugoslavija Komerc, a company that has cooperated successfully with Sony for years and that previously succeeded in bringing the top man at that powerful corporation, Mr. Aki Morita, to Belgrade.

But since Sony televisions are still present in our stores, we asked what the routes are by which they arrive in our country and whether the Japanese know about this.

"Knowing people from Sony, I think that none of them are in direct communication with people in Belgrade. That is done by wholesalers from the Far East. But the Sony people probably do know that their televisions are being sold in Yugoslavia as well. Naturally, the most important thing to everyone in this business is money, but the fact that someone is turning a blind eye, pretending not to notice what is happening... well, that's business, but it is highly hypocritical," Petrovic explains.

If it were not for the current conditions, Nikola Petrovic believes that the Sony center for the Balkans would have been in Belgrade, but now, while war is being waged in Yugoslavia, their branch offices and services have gone to the Bulgarians, Hungarians, Czechs, Greeks, and Poles.

"We must work hard to regain the confidence of the Japanese. We have no promises whatsoever, because we simply have no contact with them," Petrovic concludes.

It is said that the recipe for Coca-Cola is the world's best-kept secret, more so even that the knowledge of how to make an atomic bomb. Admittedly, modern chemistry can establish what the popular beverage consists of, but it is like the story in which 10 housewives with the same groceries, the same spices, on the same stove, are able to cook the same beans in 10 different ways, to say nothing of the taste.

It is also known that Coca-Cola supplies the main substance for production in special containers to every plant where that beverage is produced. Since there is a plant in Zemun and we are drinking Coca-Cola this summer as well, it becomes clear that one world giant is nevertheless unwilling to give up the Yugoslav market. There are no official statements from Coca-Cola, so an explanation could sound something like this: "Everyone violates the embargo in their country, we who produce and those who allow us to do so, but who also take their cut."

Belgrade Is Still Central

A completely different atmosphere prevails at the former A. Bull Honeywell, because the well-known company for computer equipment has an agreement with its Yugoslav branch on licensing, joint investment, trademark, and market access until 1997. Before the war broke out in the Yugoslav region, the Italians formed Bull YU, as well as branches in Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia, but Bull in Belgrade has remained a sort of center to which Bull offices in the aforementioned former Yugoslav republics must answer.

"We maintain all contacts with foreign partners through the Asian part of the Bull group, headquartered in Singapore. Since that country is not a member of the United Nations, it is not bound by the world community's decision to impose sanctions on Yugoslavia. At this year's Technology Trade Fair, we even concluded an agreement with the ATC software house on licensing software necessary for planning purposes in industry and civil engineering. In general, I think that Asia has proven much more flexible than Europe in all this. Business is

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business, and they have had a good ear for that," the director of Bull in Yugoslavia, Mr. Boro Belovic, explained to us.

Successful Harvest Provides Food Surpluses

LD2608152494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1420 GMT 26 Aug 94

[Text] Belgrade, Aug. 26 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav agricultural exports could this year exceed imports, but import funding is expected to create problems in conditions of banned exports.

The successful harvest could enable the government to immediately contract the export of at least 500,000 tons of wheat. Similar quantities are expected after the results of the fall sowing are announced.

Yugoslav farmers could also export 150-million-dollars worth of strawberries, raspberries, other berries and fruit products.

Wine and other products made from grapes and wine have not been exported for the past two years. Previously they generated 50 million dollars per year.

Surplus exists in the production of vegetables, livestock and meat. Stocks and this year's production of cooking oil are sufficient for the next two years.

The economic blockade is preventing the government from contracting the export of food exceeding 500 million dollars.

The United Nations Sanctions Committee allows the import of humanitarian aid, including food and certain reproduction and raw materials needed for agricultural production.

The core of the problem is how to import without exporting.

The sanctions forbid the purchase of a number of vital products, including those from the medical sphere.

Serbia

Kozyrev, Jovanovic View Talks With Milosevic

AU2908205894 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Video report by Zoran Jevdjovic on press conference given by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and FRY Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic in Belgrade on 29 Aug—recorded; unidentified correspondents and Kozyrev speak in Russian with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian]

[Text] [Jevdjovic] A brief working visit by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev to Belgrade was concluded this morning when he was seen off from Batajnica Airport by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic. Here is, in brief, how the Russian minister assessed yesterday's talks with Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, and also an assessment by the Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs:

[Kozyrev] Milosevic above all demanded that the Russian stand be accepted to a greater extent by our Western partners in the Contact Group, that is to say, that one should take as a basis, as I would put it, the support for the party of peace against the party of war. This is most important. Everything else must be subordinated to this task. We agree with him there and we shall act together. I am very pleased that the president is now relying on the assembly decision, support by the government, as well as growing support in public opinion. He is also very firm in his intentions.

As regards the measures introduced, I am of the opinion that this is in the interest of the Serbian people. These measures are being firmly respected and will be respected. I think that this intention and firmness of the leaderships of Serbia and Yugoslavia dominate over the intention to impose some super-observers and that it is clear enough that this is a serious policy and that no political leader would want to have such assembly meeting as that one and to have such a confrontation with the opposition, to have an open struggle, just to have, what shall I say? a sort of a circus or an unserious relation. [sentence as heard] This is why I think that these wishes are correct.

You know that the Bosnian Serbs are continuing—how shall I put it?—not accepting yes as an answer. They are asking the same questions all the time. All in all, the realization of all these things now depends on the Bosnian Serbs. If they say yes to the plan, they will immediately get an internationally recognized—it is even imposed on them—an internationally recognized border guaranteed by international observers. They can immediately count on the republic being recognized, just as the other side may count on the federation being recognized, as the concept such as union [zajednica] or an entity, in English, does not exist [sentence as heard]. This is only a temporary solution. The moment this process of solving is concluded, naturally, it will have some statehood just as the other side will. They will be able to have confederal relations with Serbia and that will be another additional guarantee of their security and their rights, because they will have confederal relations, if they want, with a powerful neighbor.

(?After all), the moment sanctions are lifted we, Russia, already have ready fresh economic agreements that are very far-reaching. Prime Minister Marjanovic was in Moscow and did some very useful work with Chernomyrdin [Russian Prime Minister] [words indistinct] told me about it. I have once again confirmed that to Marjanovic, who attended the talks yesterday and we have once again discussed this: There are huge economic prospects. And who do these guarantees depend on? Again on the Bosnian Serbs alone. They demand guarantees [word indistinct] that are in their hands, that

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depend on them. We are asking them: Please give us the opportunity to proffer these guarantees to you.

[Correspondent] What will happen if the referendum result is for rejecting the map and the plan and Karadzic then invokes this?

[Kozyrev] I shall reiterate that this is a referendum only in quotation marks. Since it is being held under such conditions. We are of this opinion and so is the Serbian leadership as well. Now, you should start from this point: What kind of referendum can it be under conditions of war hysteria, under the conditions of a controlled press, when [words indistinct] learned about the truth, so that one could explain something that has been already been explained a hundred times in the Yugoslav press, as President Milosevic has explained, and so on.

The leaders of the Bosnian Serbs are still asking questions all the time, that is, they cannot accept yes as an answer. And anyhow, what kind of referendum can that be? A referendum is carried out in conditions of peace, when there is free public debate [agitacija], different views, when there are political parties. This, in fact, is a war situation, a state of war, and how can a vote count be controlled there, and so on? I think that this should be treated as an ordinary political action, but not considered a real referendum, as a referendum is an expression of will, of free will.

[Correspondent] But they are going to carry out these decisions.

[Kozyrev] You may carry out whatever you like in order to excuse yourself. One can invent far-fetched [nategnut] questions, demands, in order to justify one's lack of wish to pay attention to the Serbian national interest, in any case. I shall not speak about the interest of the world community and, simply, how shall I put it? the interest to stop this fratricidal war. However, the direct national interests of the Serbia people have been threatened. And a group of, pardon my expression, politicians—I do not want to use any other words for them—is in fact playing with these interests. Perhaps, perhaps, it is because they are afraid of the expression of the people's will under the conditions of peace. You see, while the war goes on and while this war hysteria goes on, they are unchallengeable leaders. They are leaders under war conditions, and perhaps some of them are asking what will happen if the war stops and whether or not they will be elected leaders.

In this sense, Milosevic is in a different situation. Three times, three times already, he has run in elections, he was a candidate, and he knows that he won in conditions of peace. And they have not yet done that and are perhaps afraid.

[Correspondent] Is the reaction of the world community to measures taken by Serbia adequate?

[Kozyrev] I think that this reaction still contains great reserves.

[Correspondent] Do you plan to demand of Izetbegovic in Sarajevo that the Muslim army should stop military actions?

[Kozyrev] I would first want to talk with him before I issue demands. Of course, the question that this situation is somehow used for intensifying war operations will certainly be asked with full openness.

[Jevdjovic] Let us hear your assessment as well, Minister Jovanovic.

[Jovanovic] The talks were really substantial and friendly. We virtually agreed on all that is basic for the present moment of development of the crisis regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For us, observers are neither necessary or acceptable. They are not necessary because we are masters of our own decision and we have been implementing that decision. There is no need to ask us to doubt it. There simply is no alternative to peace. It is frightening to such an extent that nobody reasonable should even think in that direction. The contact group can do more and do so to the benefit of its own proposal and we hope that (?this view) will prevail in the wake of Minister Kozyrev's visit to Yugoslavia.

[Jevdjovic] From Belgrade, Minister Kozyrev left for Zagreb and then to Sarajevo aboard an UNPROFOR plane, to have talks with the Muslim leadership. After that, Minister Kozyrev will return to Zagreb where he will have talks with the Croatian leadership and will end his tour in Berlin. There he will inform contact group members and the German foreign minister about the results of the talks he held.

Sandzak Muslims Protest Belgrade's 'State Terror'

AU2908164794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Aug 94

[Text] The Muslim National Council of Sandzak has today issued a public statement reacting to the disinformation that has recently been circulated by the mass media in rump Yugoslavia, with the aim of discrediting the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], [words indistinct].

The statement recounted the chronology, methods, and means deployed by the propaganda machine of the Belgrade regime.

At the start there were attempts to impose an information blockade in order to conceal the truth about Sandzak from the wider public. However, the truth could not be concealed. Sandzak was admitted to the UN Organization of Unrepresented Peoples and Nations, and the international community started treating the Muslim National Council of Sandzak as an equal partner in peace negotiations on the solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

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In order to intimidate the people of Sandzak, the authorities of the so-called Yugoslavia started a systematic campaign of state terror—ethnic cleansing, murder, kidnapping, police torture, and arrest of civilians. The truth about this is known both to the public and to the relevant international institutions.

The next move undertaken by the Belgrade regime was to arrest the members and leadership of the SDA and the Muslim National Council of Sandzak. Those arrested have been in prison for 15 months now, and their trial is constantly being put on hold. They have no rights to defend themselves in freedom. The (?authorities') aim is to distance the political leadership from the people in order to eliminate the party. In violation of all international norms, the Belgrade authorities are attempting to eliminate Sulejman Ugljanin, chairman of the largest party of the Bosniaks in Sandzak, the SDA, and chairman of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak. The authorities have realized that the people of Sandzak continue to trust only their legitimately elected leadership.

In order to achieve their aim, the authorities have started to work simultaneously in several directions. They are supporting marginal individuals from the ranks of the Bosniak people, who—on their instructions—try and spread disinformation about the work of the institutions and the leadership of the SDA and the Muslim National Council of Sandzak. They are trying to form institutions parallel to the ones already created by the council. They are trying to infiltrate or recruit people into the party who would be under their orders. They are also arresting members of the party leadership. This perfidious way of lying to the public with the aim of sowing seeds of discord among the Bosniaks of Sandzak has been seen before.

This is said in the statement, which particularly stresses that several different institutions, parties, non-party associations, and individuals work within the Muslim National Council of Sandzak. The official policy of the council, both internally and externally, is to articulate the work and activities of council bodies.

Article Examines 'New Political Currents'

AU3008072694 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 19 Aug 94 p 13

[Article by Cvijetin Milivojevic: "Tying on a Red Scarf"]

[Text] Dusan Mihajlovic, leader of the New Democrats and godfather of the "coalition for peace," the concept of which recalls the Popular Front, has failed to accomplish his task: It seems that even that part of the Serbian opposition which has been justifying its militant anti-Milosevic attitude with the struggle for peace at any price will resist the sweet-smelling potion from the pharmacy at Andricev Venac [the presidency of Serbia]. Moreover, in the vociferous condemnation of the blockade imposed on the Bosnian Serbs it is also the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] and the Civil Association of Serbia [GSS], having unreservedly supported all the peace plans for Bosnia proposed by the West in the past two years, who have also joined the so-called war lobby. To this war lobby professional pacifists typically add the church, Vojislav Seselj, Vojislav Kostunica, and Dobrica Cosic, who is an institution in his own right. Instead of the general division into peacemakers and warmongers, which the ruling Serbian-Montenegrin coalition wanted to bring about, the things have obviously turned into a tragicomedy, in which even academician Mihajlo Markovic ("the war hawk of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]," as Milan Komnenic would say), playing the role of the commissioner of a partisan battalion, is convincing the people that we have already unified.

Radicalism at Seesaw

On the side of those who believe that the easiest way of enforcing peace on the leadership in Pale is through collective penalization of all who are not that (un)lucky to live on this bank of the Drina River, there remain only the SPS, the New Democrats, and the Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialism. The position of those with whom the regime has reckoned (civil and antiwar circles) because of its image abroad, has been defined most precisely by Dragan Veselinov, the leader of the People's Peasant's Party: "There is only one way: further to attack both nationalist groups, that of Milosevic and the clerical group led by Atanasije Jeftic, to blame them for the war cataclysm and stir dissension between them, to make them exhaust each other and eventually uncover themselves. No way of operative cooperation with Milosevic exists for us, even if he were to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize."

If the attitude toward the plan of the Contact Group and the sanctions against the Serbian republic is the main criterion for analysis of the newest currents on the Serbian political stage, then the Democratic Party [DS] can be seen as a completely unique phenomenon. As cynics of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] say, Zoran Djindjic would like to satisfy both sides—both Milosevic and Karadzic, whereas eventually he will side with the winning option anyway. In the DS itself, however, officials are denying such speculations, at the same time discarding the possibility that, due to the conflict between Karadzic and Milosevic, any more serious turmoils on the local political stage might happen at all. "The reason for that is that Milosevic is handling the issue of Pale himself, and all he wants from other parties is their support for him and his party, which would indirectly suggest to voters that even the opposition stands by his side."

Which Territory Does the Drina Run Through?

Somewhere in between Veselinovic's antiwar radicalism and Djindjic's political seesaw, the SPO is looking for its place. The leadership of this party has publicly denied the regime's maxim, according to which on the way

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toward peace, which has no other alternative, virtually all means are allowed. The leaders of the SPO are obviously using the issue to satisfy their voters (example: the protest of the Municipal Board in the Belgrade district of Palilula) who are invoking the radically nationalistic platform of the party. "The Drina runs through the middle of Serbian territory" is a slogan that the leaders of the SPO have accepted again as their own slogan after quite a long time.

What is the position of the SPS in all this? Since the general elections last year, nothing but silence has been heard from the building at Usce [the presidency of the FRY], which leaves a range of possibilities to speculators. The party's crown, that is, the president of Serbia himself, has definitely abandoned the line that made it possible for him to win all the elections in the last two years: the SPS is no longer the self-proclaimed avant-garde of the national movement.

In the ideological sense, even the formally highest officials of the party are in a state of total confusion: Milosevic changed the SPS's apparel overnight, from communist to socialist, from socialist to social-democratic, from social-democratic to radical. Today it seems that he would like to come full circle, and tie red scarves [worn by members ofthe communist-era youth organization] around his party's members' necks. In such a chaos, while expecting a possible extraordinary congress at which Milosevic would eliminate yet another group of his servants, most of the socialists want to believe that the president's new policy is a clever game of the great master. If the assumption prevails that the SPS is unstoppably sliding into the arms of the Yugoslav unified left wing, it is clear that it will lose a good many of the so- called patriotic voters. "Once you overstep a limit, every subsequent time it is much easier to do it. The first big and fatal concession that Milosevic made was when he allowed the communist name of Markovic [his wife's family name] to remain in his home," Dragan Todorovic, official of the SRS and former vice chairman of the Serbian parliament, colorfully explains the situation.

How the political situation in Serbia will further unfold will primarily depend on the Western opinion of Milosevic's turn toward peace. If it happens that the loosening of the international isolation of the country fails to occur, and even if we happen to celebrate the very fact that the sanctions will not be tightened, some circles, particularly within the DS, forecast that the regime will again be willing to reconstruct a pontoon bridge toward the opposition. "If our international position continues to complicate, it is possible that Milosevic will demand that the responsibility be shared, and make a proposal to the opposition to enter the federal and the republican government," Goran Vasic of the DS says.

SPS—Pontoon

Ominous prophets do not exclude the gloomiest possibility as well: in the case of a no-way-out position, the president of Serbia or somebody on his behalf might want to abolish all the middlemen between himself and his beloved people. The argument for such a theory is the fact that the media preparations for lasting disqualification of certain parties have already been completed or are still going on (amendments to the criminal law, banishment of Seselj from Montenegro, a new law on political parties).

The war in Bosnia has overshadowed a very important process that could, in the long run, also disturb relations among the leading parties. What the DS inaugurated at a certain stage by the slogan "Changing Serbia through laws" seems to be a realistic possibility at the moment, by which the regime could try to "buy over" the part of the antirevolutionary opposition that is pretentiously calling for "a march through institutions." For instance, the law by which the value of the transformed public property has been revalorized came about following the proposal by the DS. Cornered, the ruling party will certainly further search for ad hoc partners for similar enterprises, trying in such a way to substitute for the infusion that, until now, was coming in the form of idolatry of the Serbs across the Drina.

The first big test of the new political currents in Serbia should be the extraordinary meeting of the People's Assembly of Serbia, following the demand of the opposition, while the strongest card that the regime will play, rescuing itself from its own policy, will be to look for breaches within the opposition. This time the regime's strongest card is the fact that almost the entire opposition is condemning the blockade of the Serbian republic, but as soon as the first subquestion is raised (the peace plan of the Contact Group) a part of the opposition is closer to the regime, rather than to Karadzic's lobby. On the other hand, what might unify the entire opposition is that neither of the two key principles of the ruling party's platform has been accomplished—we have had a bloody war, yet we have not accomplished the planned national goal. Or the other way around.

Data on New Belgrade President, Officials

94BA0378B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jul 94 p 10

[Article by M. Nikic: "Decision by Belgrade Assembly: Zoran Milosevic President of City Government"]

[Text] *New president elected after nomination by Mayor Nebojsa Covic, and council members from the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] and SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] voted for him.*

The newly elected president of the Belgrade government is Zoran Milosevic, the former chairman of the SPS caucus in the City Assembly. Milosevic was elected at yesterday's session of the City Assembly after being nominated by the new mayor, Nebojsa Covic, and 75 of the 90 council members present voted for him. Aside from the SPS votes, he also received the votes of SPO council members.

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Zoran Milosevic was born in 1952 in Belgrade, is a member of the Executive Committee of the Belgrade Committee of the SPS, and is an economist by profession. Since 1993, he has been the secretary of the Coordinating Committee for Planning, Development, and Economic Policy at the Economic Chamber of Belgrade; he is a member of the Administrative Board of Infostan and DD Metal; and in the City Assembly he is chairman of the Intercity Cooperation Committee and of the Economic Council. He has completed the school for business studies of the Economic Chamber of Serbia. He is the father of three children and lives in Vracar.

Mayor Nebojsa Covic nominated Milosevic after presenting his program at yesterday's session, explaining that in nominating the city's top operative he in fact considered the serious circumstances and business that awaits the city government in the coming months.

Welcoming Milosevic's candidacy, Aleksandar Milutinovic emphasized on the behalf of the city caucus of the SPO that his election should make a major contribution to tolerance and cooperation between the caucuses of the four parties in the City Assembly. Milosevic, he said, has proven to be "a man who promotes cooperation." Although here too he reiterated that the SPO has no intention of interfering in SPS personnel policy, Milutinovic added that nevertheless he will "welcome this policy as long as it promotes the city's progress."

Thanking the council members for their confidence, the new president of the government emphasized that he is aware of the problems and obligations that await him, but that he will endeavor to continue the enormous efforts made by the previous city government in promoting the communal systems and everything that makes up the life of the citizens of Belgrade:

"The election of a new city government is coming up, of which I am mandatary. That is why I invite all who make decisions to contribute, through their recommendations, to the establishment of a government that can satisfy all obligations. I will say more about the government's program at the first session, whenever it is held, and that will happen between 6 and 12 July," he said.

In a statement for POLITIKA, Milosevic explained that since a considerable number of members of the government have resigned, the new government will have a significantly changed composition. Asked by journalists about the reasons that Covic nominated him, Milosevic responded that thus far their cooperation has proven successful but that regardless of differences in temperament and his conflict-free nature, he will consistently and resolutely pursue the already known goals of the city government.

Asked whether the SPO voted "yes" because it was promised a place in the new city government, both Milosevic and Milutinovic said no.

[Box, p 10]

Who Are Members of New Government?

The present of the new Belgrade government elected yesterday, Zoran Milosevic, refused to comment on the new composition of that government. However, it is known, based on existing knowledge, that Slobodan Pavlovic, the vice president for energy affairs and public utilities, will remain in the Presidency, and it is expected that Mira Djurovic, the current member of the government for information, will also join the presidency. It is also reasonable to assume that another member, Prof. Dr. Svetomir Stozinic, will remain in the government and that Milenko Kasanin, the director of the Youth Center, will join it.

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